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I. INTRODUCTION
Most analyses of the taxation of international income earned by
U.S. corporations or individuals have addressed income from direct
investments abroad. With the exception of routine bows to the "inter-
national tax compromise" and sporadic discussions of the practical dif-
ficulties residence countries face in collecting taxes on international
portfolio income, the taxation of international portfolio income gener-
ally has been ignored in the tax literature.!
Analysis and reassessment of U.S. tax policy regarding international
portfolio income is long overdue. The amount of international portfo-
lio investment and its role in the world economy has grown exponen-
tially in recent years. In most years since 1990, the total market value
of U.S. persons' foreign portfolio investments has exceeded the value
of U.S. corporations' foreign direct investments, and the total amount
of U.S. taxpayers' foreign portfolio income has exceeded their income
from foreign direct investments.2 Cross-border portfolio investments
are no longer a tiny tail on a large direct-investment dog. Interna-
tional portfolio investments now playa major role in the world econ-
omy, a role quite different from that played by foreign direct
investments. We can no longer afford simply to assume, as we have in
the past, that the way the United States taxes the latter is obviously
appropriate to the former. Instead we must ask explicitly what tax
policy for income from portfolio investments best serves our nation's
interest. That is the task we undertake here.
Corporations raise money to do business in three ways: They retain
what they have earned, they borrow, and they issue equity to share-
holders. At the corporation's inception, borrowing and raising equity
capital are the only options. When U.S. equity capital is invested
abroad, sometimes a U.S. corporation will open a foreign branch, but
typically it invests equity capital in the shares of a foreign corporation.
1 Some exceptions include Doron Herman, Taxing Portfolio Income in Global Financial
Markets (2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Propo-
sal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Structure]; Yaron Z. Reich,
Taxing Foreign Investors' Portfolio Investments: Developments & Discontinuities, 98 Tax
Notes International 119-16 (1998) (focusing on inbound foreign portfolio investment).
2 Elena L. Nguyen, The International Investment Position of the United States at
Yearend 2002, Surv. Current Bus., July 2003, at 12, 20-21 tbl.2 (comparing lines 17 and 19);
Douglas B. Weinberg & Patricia E. Abaroa, U.S. International Transactions, First Quarter
2003, Surv. Current Bus., July 2003, at 58-59 tbl.1 (comparing lines 14 and 15); see also Avi-
Yonah, note 1, at 1315.
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Often the voting stock of the foreign corporation is wholly or major-
ity-owned by a U.S. corporation or corporations or by U.S. persons.
Even without control, important shareholders-whether individuals
or other corporations-may exercise substantial influence over the
company's business decisions. To have control or even significant in-
fluence over corporate decisionmaking, one must own a substantial
percentage of shares in the company. In the commonly used vernacu-
lar, one must be a "direct investor." Those who do not own sufficient
shares to influence business decisions are labeled passive, or portfolio,
investors. If portfolio shareholders are unhappy with the company's
business decisions, they may sell their shares.
In the United States, investment is classified as direct whenever a
U.S. individual or company owns, directly or indirectly, at least 10%
of the voting stock of a foreign corporation or, contrariwise, when a
foreign individual or company owns, directly or indirectly, at least
10% of the voting stock of a U.S. corporation.3 Investment is classi-
fied as portfolio whenever the individual or corporation owns less
than 10% of the foreign entity.4
Perhaps the lack of discussion in the tax policy literature regarding
the taxation of international portfolio income is due to the congruent
structure of U.S. taxation of income from foreign direct investments
of U.S. multinational corporations and income from foreign portfolio
investments of U.S. individual citizens or residents. The United States
allows foreign income taxes imposed by the nation where the income
is earned to be credited against the income taxes that the United
States otherwise would impose.s This system of crediting foreign in-
come taxes first entered the U.S. income tax law in 1918.6 In 1921 the
foreign tax credit (FTC) was limited to the amount of U.S. tax that
3 IRC § 902.
4 Id. Obviously, one can quarrel with the 10% ownership threshold as establishing the
division between direct and portfolio investment, but that number is commonly used
throughout the OECD. See, e.g., Robert H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., International
Taxation 42 (NBER Working Paper No. 8854, 2002) (defining foreign direct investment as
10% or more of total ownership), available at http://papers.nber.orglpapers/w8854.pdf.
Herman, note 1, at 72. Some countries, however, use a lower threshold-5% or even
1%-in classifying investment as direct. Richard J. Vann, General Report, Trends in Com-
pany/Shareholder Taxation: Single or Double Taxation?, 88a Cahiers de Droit Fisc. Int'l
21,33 n.12 (2003). The precise dividing line between direct and portfolio investment may
be controversial, but that is not important to us here, only that some dividing line exists.
5 IRC § 901(a).
6 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080-82
(1919) (§ 222(a)(1) provided a foreign tax credit for individuals. § 238(a) provided a similar
credit for domestic corporations, and § 240(c) allocated taxes paid by a foreign corporation
in which a U.S. corporation had a direct investment).
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would have been imposed on the foreign source income.? The FTC
has served as the cornerstone of U.S. international tax policy ever
since.8
When the U.S. regime for taxing international income first came
into place, policymakers focused on direct investment abroad by U.S.
corporations: "The United States says, in effect, to its citizens-go
abroad and trade."9 U.S. international tax policy was essentially mer-
cantilist, driven largely by concerns that double taxation of interna-
tional income by both the United States and the country where the
income was earned would inhibit U.S. direct investments abroad and
also would be unfair. lO The U.S. decision unilaterally to grant a tax
credit for foreign income taxes also was grounded in the policymakers'
conviction that the source country-the country where the income
was earned-had a right to tax such income and inevitably would ex-
ercise that right,l1
Soon after the United States enacted its foreign tax credit, the
League of Nations, spurred in part by the United States, examined the
problem of international taxation, and in 1928 the League produced a
model bilateral income tax treaty,12 The decades since have seen
some changes, to be sure, but the basic structure of the League's 1928
model treaty undergirds today's model treaties of the United States,
the GECD, and the United Nations, which, in turn, form the basis for
the more than 2000 bilateral income tax treaties now in effect
throughout the world,13 Like the instigators of the U.S. foreign tax
credit, the drafters of the League's 1928 model treaty were over-
7 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 222(a)(5), 238(e), 42 Stat. 227, 249, 259 (§ 222(a)(5)
provided limitation on credit for individuals and § 238(e) provided limitation on credit for
corporations).
8 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 Duke L.J. 1021, 1044-59 (1997).
9 Mitchell B. Carroll, The Double Taxation Conference 28-29 (Sept. 3, 1927), unpub-
lished manuscript, available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, box 16, Sept. 1927
folder, (Carroll was an associate of T.S. Adams, then Tax Advisor to the Treasury Depart-
ment), quoted in Graetz & O'Hear, note 8, at 1050. U.S. tax policy was relatively forward-
looking; economic policy in the 1920's was generally protectionist.
10 For more on T.S. Adams' role in founding the modern U.S. international tax system,
see Graetz & O'Hear, note 8.
11 Id. at 1036-41.
12 Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxa-
tion and Tax Evasion, League of Nations, Doc. C.562.M.178. 1928 II (Oct. 31, 1928) [here-
inafter League Report], reprinted in 4 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Legislative History
of United States Tax Conventions 4161-75 (1962).
13 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Jan. 28, 2003, art. 24(1),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf [hereinafter OECD Model
Treaty] (proposing a model convention that includes a provision for eliminating double
taxation); UN, Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing
Countries, Jan. 1, 1980, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) <Jl 206 [hereinafter U.N. Model Treaty]; U.S.
Model Income Tax Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) <Jl 214 [hereinafter
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 56 Tax L. Rev. 541 2002-2003
2003] TAXING INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO INCOME 541
whelmingly concerned with international business incomeY A few
moguls may have owned widespread international portfolio invest-
ments, but portfolio investments simply were not of much importance
to the world economy at that time.
The tax literature frequently labels the League of Nations' basic al-
location of income taxes in its model treaty between countries of
source and countries of residence as the "international tax compro-
mise." That compromise typically is described as allocating active
business income to the jurisdiction where it is earned (the source juris-
diction) and passive or portfolio income to the jurisdiction from which
the capital is supplied (the residence jurisdiction).15 But this descrip-
tion buries the fact that source countries frequently impose income
taxes on income from passive portfolio investments in the form of so-
called withholding taxes: final taxes imposed at a flat rate on gross
dividend and interest income paid to foreigners. 16
In 1984-both to encourage foreigners to purchase U.S. debt to
help finance federal deficits and to help U.S. companies borrow in
world markets-Congress repealed the U.S. withholding tax on port-
folio interest income.J7 Since then zero taxation by source countries
of portfolio interest income has become commonplace.ls But source
countries typically continue to impose withholding taxes on dividend
income earned by foreigners. The Code imposes such a tax at a 30%
rate, but the United States commonly reduces that rate to 15% by
treaty.19 In an income tax treaty negotiated in 2001, the United States
and the United Kingdom both agreed to eliminate their withholding
taxes on certain direct dividends, thus-in that instance at least-
bringing the longstanding description of the "international tax com-
promise" closer to reality.2o The U.S.-U.K. treaty may signal a funda-
mental change in U.S. tax policy. A similar policy was included in new
U.S. Model Treaty]; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, U.N., World Investment
Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness xv-xvi (2002).
14 League Report, note 12.
15 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Structure, note 1, at 1305-06.
16 See, e.g., IRC §§ 871(a) (nonresident alien individuals), 882(a) (foreign corporations).
17 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127, 98 Stat. 494, 648-52; IRC
§§ 871(h), 881.
18 See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Aug. 31, 1994, Fr.-U.S., art.
11(1),2 Tax Treaties (CCH) lj[ 3001, at 27,005-8; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital Gains, July 24, 2001, U.K.-U.S., art. 11(1), 4 Tax Treaties (CCH) lj[ 10,900, at
44,505-11 [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. treaty).
19 U.S. Model Treaty, note 13, art. 10, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) lj[ 214.10.
20 The 2001 U.S.-U.K. treaty allows a withholding rate of up to 15% on portfolio divi-
dends. U.S.-U.K. treaty, note 18, art. 10, lj[ 2, 4 Tax Treaties (CCH), at 44,505-9. U.S.
portfolio investors in the United Kingdom will not face any withholding tax only because
the United Kingdom does not impose withholding tax on dividends, but instead negotiates
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protocols signed with Australia and Mexico.21 A zero withholding tax
on similar dividends will likely be considered in Treasury's forthcom-
ing treaty negotiations with the Netherlands.22 Income from interna-
tional portfolio dividends has grown more rapidly than income from
international direct dividends in recent years, but the taxation of these
portfolio dividends has yet to receive serious review from Treasury.
II. THE GROWTH OF OUTBOUND U.S. FOREIGN
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Numerous commentators have remarked on the shortcomings of
the data available about the magnitude of foreign portfolio invest-
ments (FPI) by U.S. persons and of portfolio investments by foreign-
ers into the United States.23 We fill that gap somewhat here by
withholding tax-equivalents through its tax treaties. There is no such equivalent in the new
U.S.-U.K. treaty. Id.
21 Second Additional Protocol to the 1992 Mex.-U.S. Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation, Nov. 26, 2002, art. II(2), 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 'lI 5903A; Protocol to the
1982 Austl.-U.S. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Sept. 27, 2001, art.
6(2),1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 'lI 505. Like the new U.S.-U.K. treaty, the new protocols signed
with Australia and Mexico preserve withholding taxes on foreign portfolio dividends.
22 U.S., Netherlands to Revise Income Tax Treaty, Treasury Announces, 94 Tax Notes
1111 (Mar. 4, 2002).
23 See, e.g., Roy Culpeper, Resurgence of Private Flows to Latin America: The Role of
North American Investors, in Coping With Capital Surges: The Return of Finance to Latin
America 1, 32-33 (Ricardo Ffrench-Davis & Stephany Griffith-Jones eds., 1995) [hereinaf-
ter Capital Surges] (noting that "[m]ore complete, consistent, and prompt reporting of sec-
ondary market and derivative transactions would be beneficial to all participants (source
and recipient countries, savers, investors, and borrowers alike)"); UN TDBOR, Commis-
sion on Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues, Expert Meeting on Portfolio
Investment Flows and Foreign Direct Investment, Provisional Agenda Item 3, Foreign
Portfolio Investment (FPI) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Characteristics, Similari-
ties, Complementarities and Differences, Policy Implications and Development Impact,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/com.2/EM.6/2 and Corr.1 (1999), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/c2em6d2&cl.en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Report]; International Monetary Fund,
Results of the 1997 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 8, 12 tbl.l.l (1999). Certain
institutional characteristics of international financial markets make it difficult to accurately
track flows of portfolio investment. For example, bearer bonds that allow buyers to remain
anonymous are the most commonly traded bond instruments in the Eurobond markets.
Anonymity of buyers means that a U.S. mutual fund purchasing Latin American debt in
the London markets will not register as a transaction in which a U.S. taxpayer has pur-
chased Latin debt. Rather, traditional government tracking mechanisms will treat the
purchase as a flow of portfolio investment from Europe to Latin America. Stephany Grif-
fith-Jones, European Private Flows to Latin America: The Facts and the Issues, in Capital
Surges, supra, at 41. Recent efforts such as the IMF's 1997 coordinated portfolio invest-
ment survey and related efforts by Treasury to track FPI help to provide snapshots of the
sources and destinations of international portfolio investment, but do not solve the prob-
lem of tracking flows of portfolio investment on an ongoing basis. See William L. Griever,
Gary A. Lee & Francis E. Warnock, The U.S. System for Measuring Cross-Border Invest-
ment in Securities: A Primer With a Discussion of Recent Developments, 87 Fed. Res.
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describing the growth over time of U.S. outbound and inbound FPI,
and by reporting recent data on flows of U.S. outbound FPI.
In 1960, outbound FPI by U.S. nationals totaled only $10 billion.24
Portfolio investment in long-term securities by foreigners in the
United States totaled $13.8 billion.25 By 1986 U.S. outbound foreign
portfolio investment was $158 billion.26 In 1997 outbound FPI from
the United States was more than $1.7 trillion,27 while portfolio invest-
ments by foreigners in long-term securities in the United States had
expanded to $2.806 trillion.28 The $1.7 trillion in U.S. outbound FPI
in 1997 accounted for 29% of FPI holdings reported worldwide.29 By
the end of 2001, the stock of U.S. outbound FPI had grown to $2.262
trillion dollars.30 Total FPI assets owned by U.S. persons grew 21.1 %
Bull., 633, 646 (2001) (discussing recommended changes to the U.S. data collection system
for tracking flows of portfolio investments).
24 Russell Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States: Develop-
ments in 1971, Surv. Current Bus., Oct. 1972, at 18, 21 tbl.3 (foreign securities).
25 Office of the Asst. Sec'y for Econ. PoJ'y, Treasury Dep't, Summary of Report on
Foreign Portfolio Investment in the United States as of December 31, 1997 tbl.2, available
at http://www.treas.gov/tic/shI94sum.html [hereinafter Treasury FPI Summary].
26 Christopher L. Bach, U.S. International Transactions, Revised Estimates for 1974-96,
Surv. Current Bus., July 1997, at 43, 46 tbl.2, available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/arti-
cles/internat/bpa/1997/0797bp.pdf; Office of the Ass't Sec'y, Int'l Affairs, Treasury Dep't &
Division of In!'1 Finance, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Report on U.S.
Holdings of Foreign Long-Term Securities as of December 31, 1997, and December 31,
1999 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/tic/flts.pdf [hereinafter Treasury FLTS
Report].
27 Treasury FLTS Report, note 26, at 22 tbl.l5.
28 Treasury FPI Summary, note 25, at tbls.1-3. Inbound FPI to the United States has
grown rapidly as well, albeit at a slightly lower rate. Between 1984 and 1997, inbound FPI
to the United States grew at a compound growth rate of 20%. That translated to a lO-fold
increase in the stock of inbound FPI in the United States-from $268 billion in 1984 to $2.8
trillion in 1997. Even more impressive, between 1994 and 1997, inbound U.S. FPI in
long-term securities more than doubled, from $1.2 trillion to $2.8 trillion. Treasury FPI
Summary, note 25, at tbls.1-3. Over the 1994-1997 period, foreign holdings of U.S. equities
increased 133%, while foreign holdings of debt securities increased 122%. Id. By March
31,2000, the time of the last benchmark survey of foreign holdings of U.S. long term secur-
ities, and a date near the peak of the U.S. stock market bubble, inbound foreign investors
held almost $3.6 trillion in U.S. long-term securities. Griever et al., note 23, at 638 tbl.l
(200l).
29 Portfolio investment channeled through offshore financial centers was not included in
the IMF's 1997 coordinated portfolio investment survey. Thus, this figure may under- or
over-represent portfolio investment holdings by U.S. taxpayers. International Monetary
Fund, note 23, at 132, 141-42 tbl.I1I.2.
30 Office of the Under Sec'y, In!'1 Aff., Treasury Dep't, Securities Reports Division,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York & Division of Int'l Finance, Board of Governors, Fed-
eral Reserve System, Report on U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities as of Dec. 31, 2001, at
3 tbl.l (May 2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/tic/shc2001r.pdf [hereinafter Treasury
Report on Holdings].
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per year between 1986 and 2001.31 Between December 31, 1997 and
December 31, 1999, the stock of U.S. outbound portfolio investment
jumped from $1.755 to $2.456 trillion dollars.32 Between December
31,1999 and December 31, 2001, the stock of U.S. outbound portfolio
investment fell to $2.262 trillion dollars,33 principally due to the de-




FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT BY U.S. TAXPAYERS ABROAD
2500 -r--------------------------,
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Sources: Scholl, note 24; Bach. note 26; FlTS Report, nole 26; Treasury Report on Holdings, note 30.
Note: 1997, 1999. and 2001 data comes from U.S. Treasury benchmark surveys on U.S. holdings of foreign securities. Earlier data Is only available
through the standard Survey of Current Business publication and revisions, and Is likely underestimated.
In an average month in 1999, U.S. taxpayers sent $215 billion in
portfolio investment abroad.34 The average monthly outbound flow
of U.S. FPI today is significantly larger than the total stock of U.S. FPI
31 Compound annual growth rate calculated based on $158 billion of outbound FPI in
1986 and $2.262 trillion for the stock of U.S. outbound FPI in 2001. See Bach, note 26, at
46 tbI.2 (1986); Treasury Report on Holdings, note 30, at 3 tbl.1.
32 Treasury FLTS Report, note 26, at 22 tbl.15.
33 Treasury Report on Holdings, note 30, at 5 tbI.2.
34 Id. Note that this figure is based on reported annual cash purchases for outbound FPI
divided by 12. The figure likely underestimates the size of gross U.S. FPI due to the grow-
ing frequency of international mergers and acquisitions implemented through stock swaps.
These stock swaps provide U.S. shareholders with in kind compensation of foreign stock
holdings without any cash flow that would require reporting. Griever et aI., note 23, at
641-42; Treasury Dep't, TIC Capital Movements: United States Transactions with Foreign-
ers in Long-Term Securities charts CM-C, CM-D, available at http://www.treas.gov/tic/
exhibitsc&d.pdf.
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assets in 1986.35 In 2002 alone, U.S. foreign portfolio investors bought
nearly $1.26 trillion in foreign equities.36 The level of investment
flows is particularly relevant here since income tax consequences are
triggered by flows of investment-sales and purchases of assets as well
as payments of investment income-not the level of the stock of in-
vestment assets.
Notwithstanding the overall growth in U.S. outbound FPI, the bulk
of U.S. portfolio investment abroad is still concentrated in relatively
few countries. In 1999,68% of U.S. FPI went to 10 countries.37 These
10 leading recipients of U.S. FPI account for less than 30% of world-
wide GDP.38 U.S. FPI is therefore significantly more concentrated
than is worldwide economic output. The United Kingdom leads the
countries where U.S. taxpayers invest FPI dollars, accounting for 16%
of all U.S. outbound FPJ.39 Figure 2 depicts shares of outbound U.S.
FPI invested in specific countries in 1999.
While U.S. FPI tend to be concentrated in those countries that are
most important in terms of worldwide economic activity-all of the G-
7 countries, for example, are among the top 10 locations for U.S.
FPI-there is surprisingly little correlation on a country-by-country
basis of U.S. FPI per capita compared to GDP per capita.40 U.S. port-
folio investment simply does not mirror the global distribution of eco-
nomic activity. The concentration of U.S. FPI in 10 or 15 countries
may instead be explainable by the relative accessibility of various mar-
kets over time, the path dependence of investment patterns, and other
factors, perhaps induding net shareholder tax rates for investments in
specific countries.41
35 Compare text accompanying note 34 with text accompanying note 26. The churn rate
suggested by these figures is extremely high and may be the result of problems with the
TIC data collection system. For a discussion of the limitations of the current TIC system,
see Griever et aI., note 23.
36 Treas. Bull., Sept. 2003, at 88 tbI.CM-V-5, col.14 (Sept. 2003), available at http://
fms.treas.govlbulletin/b33cm5.doc.
37 Treasury FLTS Report, note 26, at 23 tb1.16. Authors' calculations based on raw data
provided in the Treasury report.
38 GDP numbers used in this analysis are for 1997 in 1995 Dollars estimated via the
Atlas Method. World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2002), available at
http://www.worldbank.orgldatalonlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html.
39 Treasury FLTS Report, note 26, at 23 tb1.16.
40 See Figure 3. When viewed through the lens of concentration of investment, Switzer-
land, the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden become worthy of attention as nations into
which the United States disproportionately directs portfolio investment. Meanwhile, Japan
appears relatively under-represented in the portfolios of U.S taxpayers. That country's
prolonged recession may explain the relative paucity of U.S. FPI into Japan. Reliable data
are not available for country-by-country U.S. outbound FPI in the late 1980's, before the
Japanese downturn.
41 See generally Brian Aitken, Have Institutional Investors Destabilized Emerging Mar-
kets?, 16 Contemp. Econ. Pol'y 173 (1998) (examining impact of "positive feedback trad-
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FIGURE 2


















Source: Treasury FLTS Report, nole 26, al 231bl. 16.
III. How ARE DIRECT AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS DIFFERENT?
As we have indicated, U.S. policy for taxing income from FPI fol-
lowed-without any serious independent analysis-the policies devel-
oped for U.S. foreign direct investments (FDI). But there are
important economic differences between direct and portfolio invest-
ments that may imply quite different tax treatment of their income.
Indeed, these economic differences suggest that the principal norma-
tive concepts used to evaluate international tax policy generally-cap-
ital export neutrality and capital import neutrality-have far less
relevance to the taxation of international portfolio income than they
might for evaluating the taxation of income from direct investments.
This Section describes how these two types of investments diverge ec-
ing" by institutional investors on emerging stock markets); Culpeper, note 23. For
example, the net shareholder tax rate on dividends for portfolio investments by U.S. tax-
payers through "collective investment institutions," such as a U.S. mutual fund, was histori-
cally 33.25% in the United Kingdom, compared to 46.6% for an investment in the United
States. OECD, Taxation of Cross-Border Portfolio Investment: Mutual Funds and Possi-
ble Tax Distortions 114 tbI.AI.1.F (1999). This disparity may help explain the UK's posi-
tion as the top recipient of U.S. outbound FPI. British tax laws changed beginning in the
year 2000. Thus, the net shareholder tax rate for investment by U.S. taxpayers in the
United Kingdom in 2003 is higher than 33.25%. See Rev. Proc. 2000-13, 2000-1 C.B. 515;
see also note 67 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 3
FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT BY U.S. NATIONALS ABROAD
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for 1997 in 1995 Dollars estimated via the Alias Method.
Note: Three countries with GNP/Capita are off the scale of this chart. Switzerland has $9,000 FPl/Capita and GNP/Capita $43,100. Luxembourg has
FPI/Capita 519,600 and GNP/Capita $46,700. Finally, Bermuda has FPUCapita of $422,300 and GNP/Capita of $35,600. (Note that Bermuda has a
population of only around 60,000 persons).
onomically and outlines the key distinctions in the current taxation of
income from direct and portfolio investments.
A. The Key Tax Distinction Between Foreign Direct Investment and
Portfolio Investment
Foreign portfolio income often is earned today by both individuals
and corporations, while FDI virtually always is made by corporations.
As we noted, whether an investment in a foreign entity by a U.S. cor-
poration is classified as direct or portfolio technically turns on the de-
gree of ownership of the foreign company; to qualify as a direct
investment, some minimum threshold of ownership-generally 10%
of voting stock-must be crossed.42 It may be simpler analytically,
however, to regard income from FDI as representing the profits from
conducting business activities abroad-the profits of the firm-and in-
come from FPI as representing passive investment income-the prof-
its realized by investors in the firm.43 Although we follow the
technical definitions here, it may similarly be helpful to think of an
investment as direct when a U.S. taxpayer has sufficient control over
the business decisions of the foreign entity; when the U.S. taxpayer
has little or no control over the foreign entity's business decisions, the
investments are typically FPI.
42 See, e.g., IRC § 902,
43 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Structure, note I, at 1308-10.
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Although a number of U.S. tax consequences turn on the distinction
between FDI and FPI, which generally corresponds to the tax law's
distinction between active and passive income,44 here we emphasize
one. Whenever a U.S. company has sufficient control over a foreign
corporation, it is permitted to credit against its U.S. tax liability corpo-
rate income taxes imposed by the foreign country on the foreign cor-
poration's earnings, either when those earnings occur or when the
U.S. corporation receives dividends paid out of those earnings. In
other words, a direct corporate investor is entitled to the "deemed-
paid" or "indirect" foreign tax credit.45 In contrast, portfolio investors
generally are not allowed any U.S. tax credit for corporate income
taxes imposed abroad but instead are allowed to credit only foreign
withholding taxes paid on dividend or interest income.46 In some in-
stances, however, most notably for portfolio investments in France,
integration of corporate and shareholder taxes has overridden this di-
chotomy, and U.S. portfolio shareholders effectively receive a credit
for some or all of corporate taxes paid abroad.47
In the OECD countries where U.S. corporations have substantial
FDI, corporate income taxes in 2002 ranged from a low of 16% (in
Ireland) to a high of 40.2% (in Belgium).48 Most corporate tax rates
in OECD countries today are in the range from 25% to 35%. By
imposing these corporate income taxes, source countries exercise their
right to tax international business income. On the other hand, source
countries today rarely exercise any right to tax interest income earned
by foreign portfolio lenders and, where bilateral treaties are in force,
tend to tax portfolio dividend income at a zero to 15% withholding
44 For instance, passive income is income that would be considered foreign personal
holding company income as defined in § 954(c). IRC § 904(d)(2)(A)(i). Passive income is
put in a separate "basket" from other income under the FTC limitation system, thereby
preventing cross-crediting of passive income foreign tax credits against credits on active
income. IRC § 904(d)(1 )(A). Dividends, interest, royalties, rents, and annuities are all
treated as passive income. IRC § 954(c)(1 )(A). The Code treats effectively connected in-
come (active income), IRC §§ 871(b), 882, differently from fixed or determinable annual
or periodical income, IRC §§ 871(a), 881 (passive income).
45 Section 902 provides that "a domestic corporation which owns 10 percent or more of
the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any taxable
year shall be deemed to have paid" a ratable proportion of such foreign corporation's
foreign income taxes. IRC § 902(a).
46 IRC § 901.
47 See OECD, Taxation of Cross-Border Portfolio Investment: Mutual Funds and Possi-
ble Tax Distortions 39, 42 tb1.2.7 (1999); see also notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
48 Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD, OECD Tax Database tbl. 5 (July
23, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.orgiEN/documentlO,,EN-document-99-3-no-l-
32519-99,00.html; see David Carey & Economics Dep't, OECD, Tax Reform in Belgium,
ECO/WKP (2003)8, at 33 & box 2 (May 15, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.orgleco
(noting the Belgian government announced in 2002 it would reduce the corporate tax rate
from 40.17% to 33.99% in order to restore the country's competitive position).
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rate. This is why commentators frequently describe the "international
tax compromise" as generally allocating the taxation of portfolio in-
come to the country where the investor resides, although that is an
oversimplification.49
B. The Key Economic Distinctions Between Foreign Direct and
Portfolio Investment
Foreign direct investment is often undertaken by corporations to
earn economic rents.50 Foreign direct investment decisions therefore
frequently are driven by opportunities to exploit economies of scale,
economies of scope, or proprietary business advantages. Further-
more, considerable evidence suggests that FDI by U.S. multinationals
is complementary to domestic investments, rather than a substitute for
them.51 Empirical economic evidence, however, also suggests that
FDI decisions are sensitive to differences in tax burdens.52
In contrast, portfolio investment dollars are volatile and move rap-
idly throughout the world seeking the highest return possible for a
given level of risk. 53 In portfolios managed by investment profession-
als, investments in one foreign country are frequently interchangeable
with investments in countries with similar risk/return profiles.54 One
consequence is that portfolio investment dollars abroad may substi-
tute for investments at home.
Surprisingly, economic analysis to date offers no clear consensus
about the extent to which U.S. portfolio investors are tax-sensitive.
While economic theory suggests that portfolio investors should be
tax-sensitive, seeking the greatest after-tax returns, the empirical data
is mixed. For example, empirical research by Joel Dickson and John
Shoven suggests that as recently as 1993 investors did not pay much
attention to the effect of income taxes on the rates of return of their
portfolio investments.55 Shoven and Dickson examined 147 of the 150
49 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Structure, note 1, at 1306.
50 See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux, Issues in the Taxation of Income From Foreign Portfo-
lio and Direct Investment [hereinafter Investment Income Taxation], in Taxing Capital In-
come in the European Union 110, 131 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000).
51 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy 568-70 (1993).
52 Gordon & Hines, note 4, at 43-49, 56-57.
53 Barry Eichengreen & Albert Fishlow, Contending With Capital Flows: What Is Dif-
ferent About the 1990s?, in Capital Flows and Financial Crises 23, 59 (Miles Kahler ed.,
1998).
54 See generally UN Conference on Trade and Development, Comprehensive Study of
the Interrelationship Between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio In-
vestment (FPI) 24-25 (1999).
55 Joel M. Dickson & John B. Shoven, Ranking Mutual Funds on an After-Tax Basis
(NBER Working Paper No. 4393, 1993), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w4393.pdf.
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largest U.S. mutual funds in existence on October 31, 1992.56 They
convincingly showed that for these funds the relative ranking based on
rates of return was substantially different pretax and post-tax.57 In
1993, however, only one among the very large number of information
sources dedicated to providing investors with mutual fund information
published after-tax returns.58 Nor had prior academic papers evaluat-
ing mutual fund performance adjusted returns for shareholder-level
taxation.59 The lack of easily available data regarding after-tax per-
formance, combined with the disparity between pretax and post-tax
rankings for mutual funds, suggests that (as recently as 1993 at least)
most mutual fund investors did not make their mutual fund portfolio
investment decisions on a post-tax basis. And most mutual funds ap-
parently were little concerned with the tax consequences of their in-
vestments for their fund's shareholders.
Since 1993, however, after-tax information and after-tax results
have become increasingly available and possibly important to mutual
fund investors. In January 2001, the SEC approved a rule requiring
mutual funds to disclose after-tax returns.60 New mutual funds have
emerged in the decade subsequent to the Shoven-Dickson study ad-
vertising themselves as "tax-efficient" or "tax-sensitive." Major non-
proprietary sources of information about mutual funds, such as
Morningstar, now rank mutual funds based on after-tax perform-
ance.61 These changes suggest that both mutual fund investment man-
agers and individual mutual fund shareholders are becoming more
sensitive to tax effects on portfolio investment returns.
Nevertheless, tax-efficient funds accounted for only 12% of all in-
flows into equity funds in the first 10 months of 2001.62 This figure
represents significant growth compared to the 2% of equity fund in-
flows into tax-efficient funds in 2000,63 but still represents only a rela-
tively small portion of mutual fund investments. In the 12-month
period ending March 2003, tax-managed funds performed only half a
percentage point better than other funds, and tougher times are now
56 Id. at 4-5. Two of the 150 largest funds were excluded for technical reasons related to
unavailability of appropriate data, and one was excluded because it merged into another
fund.
57 Id. at 12-16 and data referred to therein.
58 Id. at 1.
59 Id. at 2 (citing only one exception).
60 Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns, Securities Act of 1933 and Investment
Company Act of 1940 Release Nos. 33-7941,34-43857,66 Fed. Reg. 9002 (Jan. 18,2001).
61 Morningstar.com offers preliquidation, post-tax rates of return for all the mutual
funds it rates on its highly popular "quicktake" reports. See http://morningstar.com.
62 Elizabeth Reed Smith, Fund Strategies to Soothe Tax Pain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
2001, at C8.
63 Id.
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predicted for tax-managed funds since most investors now have capi-
tal losses to offset gains from funds that are not tax-sensitive.64 The
extent to which U.S. portfolio investors' investment decisions are now
tax-sensitive therefore remains unclear.65
C. Portfolio Investors Favor Their Home Country
Economic theory, which emphasizes the role of risk diversification
in the investment choices of portfolio investors, predicts, without
taxes, a full worldwide diversification of portfolio investments.66 The
problem for the theory, however, is that portfolio investment exhibits
a substantial "home bias," that is, a large percentage of the debt and
equity issued in any country is directly in the hands of that country's
residents.67
Economists, to date, have been unable to explain the home-bias
phenomenon. Indeed, given the difficulties of enforcing resi-
dence-country income taxes on FPI (discussed in Section VI), we
might expect to see a bias in favor of foreign rather than domestic
investments.
A large economic literature is devoted to efforts to explain the
home bias,68 but no explanation is yet regarded as convincing. Hedg-
ing explanations are to little avail, and neither transaction costs nor
tax differentials have much explanatory power. In several countries,
corporate-shareholder tax integration regimes favor domestic over
foreign investment.69 But these tax effects are far too small to explain
the home-country bias seen in the data.70 Intuitively, the most con-
64 J. Alex Tarquinio, Tougher Path for Tax-Managed Funds, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13,2003,
at C6.
65 Mutual funds play an increasingly important role in meeting the financial goals of
U.S. portfolio investors, and are useful to study in attempting to understand the decision-
making that drives the destination of portfolio investment more generally. Total assets of
equity mutual funds increased from $83.1 billion at year-end 1984 to $3,962.3 billion at
year-end 2000, representing a compound annual growth rate of 25.2% over the period.
Investment Company Institute, 2001 Mutual Fund Fact Book 64 (May 2001), available at
http://www.ici.orglicUrameset.html(lastvisitedJuly6.2003).Ingeneral.this reflects a
relative shift away from direct household investment in equities to indirect ownership of
equities through investment vehicles. The trend with respect to FPI reflects the same rela-
tive shift. At the end of 1999, U.S. investors held over $700 billion in FPI through
U.S.-based mutual funds, thereby accounting for almost 30% of total U.S. outbound FPI.
Lipper Analytical Services, World Equity Database (2000). Data assembled by Derek
Lewis at authors' request and on file with authors. Mutual funds are now the single most
commonly utilized vehicle for FPI for U.S. taxpayers.
66 Gordon & Hines, note 4, at 37.
67 Id.; Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba, Investor Diversification and Interna-
tional Equity Markets, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 222 (1991).
68 Gordon & Hines, note 4, at 39-40 & n.59 (citing studies).
69 Vann, note 4, at 24.
70 Gordon & Hines, note 4, at 39.
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vincing explanation is grounded in information asymmetries; investors
have better information about domestic than foreign securities.71 But,
whatever the reason, "aggregate demand for domestic equity is much
less elastic than would be implied by standard models of portfolio
choice."72 This means that the economic impact of taxes on domestic
portfolio investment income is less than might be expected.
D. Portfolio Capital Flees When the Milk Goes Sour
Unlike direct investments, portfolio investments are highly volatile.
Portfolio investments move through the international capital markets
quickly in response to changes in economic circumstances.73 In the
1990's, for example, the UK's unplanned exit from the European Rate
Mechanism in 1992, the Mexican Peso crisis, the Asian financial crisis,
and the financial fallout associated with the demise of the Long Term
Capital Management hedge funds all demonstrated the volatility of
portfolio investments. The most dramatic instances of the volatility of
portfolio capital during that decade involved the flight of capital from
developing countries. The serious political and economic conse-
quences that resulted often were not caused by specific policy deci-
sions within the country, but rather resulted from flows of portfolio
capital triggered by changes in market expectations and herd
behavior.74
Institutional investors, especially from the United States, dominated
the flow of portfolio equity to the developing world in the 1990's.75
"Modern risk management techniques of portfolio managers, such as
computerized portfolio insurance/programme trading strategies,
value-at-risk and mark-to-market models, may exacerbate the move-
ments of asset prices and increase the risk of [portfolio] contagion."76
The five developing economies that received the largest flows per cap-
ita of portfolio capital from the United States as of 1997 were Mexico,
Brazil, Chile, Hungary, and Malaysia.77 Each experienced serious ec-
71 Roger H. Gordon & A. Lans Bovenberg, Why Is Capital So Immobile Internation-
ally? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital Income Taxation, 86 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1057, 1073 (1996) (concluding that asymmetric information is a "promising explana-
tion for the empirical evidence on the international mobility of capital").
72 Gordon & Hines, note 4, at 40.
73 See, e.g., Eichengreen & Fishlow, note 53, at 59.
74 See generally Capital Flows and Financial Crises, note 53.
75 Rachel McCulloch & Peter A. Petri, Equity Financing of East Asian Development, in
Capital Flows and Financial Crises, note 53, at 158, 166.
76 UNCTAD Report, note 23, at 15.
77 Treasury FLTS Report, note 26; World Bank, World Development Indicators
CD-ROM, note 38. Developing countries for purpose of this analysis were defined as
countries with GDP/capita of less than $6,000, as measured by the World Bank. Brazil and
Mexico top the list of countries influenced by U.S. investment. U.S. taxpayers held $64
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onomic shocks due to the flight of portfolio investor capital during the
1990's.78 A study of 20 emerging markets in the aftermath of the 1994
Mexican peso crisis found a connection between a country's financial
and currency vulnerability and the composition of its capital inflows.79
In particular, larger short-term foreign portfolio flows were correlated
with greater disarray in the local financial markets.80
The pain of these shocks, however, was not limited to developing
countries. Particularly in response to the Asian financial crisis and the
demise of Long Term Capital Management, financial turmoil reached
markets in Europe and the United States when portfolio equity
churned as investments turned sour.81 In response, debates emerged
over the appropriate international economic policies in light of the
risks posed by foreign portfolio flows. Nobel Prize-winning econo-
mists, world-renowned financiers, and central bankers have all de-
bated whether and how global portfolio capital flows should be
constrained.82 Numerous popular books83 as well as major works of
economic scholarship have addressed the subject. Jeffrey Sachs, for
example, claims that, at a minimum, the international financial system
needs the functional equivalent of the U.S. bankruptcy code and much
billion and $52 billion respectively in investments in Brazil and Mexico in 1999. These two
nations received 48% of U.S. outbound FPI to developing countries. Mexico was first in
terms of dollars of U.S. outbound FPI received and second in U.S. FPI dollars received per
capita. Brazil was second in U.S. FPI received and eleventh in FPI received per capita.
Chile, Hungary, and Malaysia were the other reasonably large developing countries that
received over $400/capita in FPI from the United States in the 1990's.
78 See Andres Velasco & Pablo Cabezas, Alternative Responses to Capital Inflows: A
Tale of Two Countries, in Capital Flows and Financial Crises, note 53, at 128; Dorothy
Meadow Sobol, Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital
Flows, in Capital Flows and Financial Crises, note 53, at 186 (suggesting, inter alia, that
Hungary was spared from the effects of the 1994 peso crisis because of the fact that portfo-
lio investment had not yet entered the country).
79 Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron Tornell & Andres Velasco, Financial Crises in Emerging Mar-
kets: The Lessons From 1995, 147, 152 (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996).
80 Id.; see also Jeffrey Sachs, Aaron Tornell & Andres Velasco, The Collapse of the
Mexican Peso: What Have We Learned?, 22 Econ. Pol'y 13, 21, 25 (1996) (noting the
Mexican banking system converted massive capital inflows, a significant part of which was
short-term portfolio investment, into short-term peso debt, which was responsible in large
part for the banking system's fragility).
81 See generally Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-
Term Capital Management (2000).
82 "Distinguished mainstream economists are questioning the wisdom of capital account
Iiberalisation, the efficiency of international capital markets or the role of the IMF.
Among them are Martin Feldstein, head of the National Bureau of Economic Research,
Paul Krugman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jeffrey Sachs, director of the
Harvard Institute for International Development and, with the official institutions, Joseph
Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank." Martin Wolf, Ins and Outs of Capital Flows,
Fin. Times (London), June 16, 1998, at 25. (some of the affiliations of the people listed have
changed since 1998.)
83 See, e.g., George Soros, George Soros On Globalization (2002); Joseph Stiglitz,
Globalization and its Discontents (2002).
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more extensive banking regulation.84 In the international tax context,
portfolio capital movements renewed interest in the "Tobin Tax,"
named after James Tobin, the Nobel Prize-winning economist who
first proposed the tax in 1971.85 The Tobin Tax is an excise tax on
capital transactions specifically designed to impose an additional bur-
den on fast-moving capital, including much of the world's current FPI.
Its burden would be far lower or nonexistent for slow-moving capital,
which includes nearly all FDI.86 The debate over policies appropriate
to deal with global capital flows in international economic policymak-
ing circles, however, has had almost no impact on the international
income tax literature, which, as we have indicated, generally has ig-
nored the question of whether FPI should be taxed differently from
FDI.B7
E. The Taxation of Portfolio Investment Does Not Affect the
Location of Plant and Equipment
The empirical economic evidence demonstrates that corporate deci-
sions about where to locate plant and equipment and headquarters
activities, such as research and development, are quite sensitive to dif-
ferences in the corporate-level taxes applicable to the income gener-
ated by these investments. But taxes on portfolio investment income
generally do not affect the location of corporate investments in plant
and equipment.88
Economic theory holds that effective marginal tax rates on FPI
might influence the locational decisions of companies if a change in
tax policy changes world interest rates. If, however, as most policy-
84 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Alternative Approaches to Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, in
Capital Flows and Financial Crises, note 53, at 247, 259, 260-61; see also Stephany Griffith-
Jones, Global Capital Flows: Should They be Regulated? (1998).
85 See, e.g., Policy Forum: Sand in the Wheels of International Finance, 105 Econ. J. 160
(1995) (noting support of influential commentators for a tax on speculative transactions);
R. Glenn Hubbard, Securities Transactions Taxes: Tax Design, Revenue, and Policy Con-
siderations, 61 Tax Notes 985, 986 & n.1 (Nov. 22, 1993) (offering brief introduction to the
debate over securities transactions taxes); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers,
The Case for a Securities Transactions Excise Tax, 48 Tax Notes 879, 881 (Aug. 13, 1990)
(discussing Tobin's concern over the diversion of human and capital resources into securi-
ties trading).
86 Barry Eichengreen, James Tobin & Charles Wyplosz, Two Cases for Sand in the
Wheels of International Finance, 105 Econ. J. 160, 163-65 (1995).
87 The tax literature, however, has considered whether differences in enforcement issues
suggest differences in taxation of FPI and FDI. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globaliza-
tion, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573,
1583-85 (2000) [hereinafter Globalization]; Hubbard, note 85; Summers & Summers, note
85.
88 See Company Taxation in the Internal Market 142-43 box 5, 150-52 box 6 (European
Comm'n, Working Paper No. 582, 2001) [hereinafter EC Working Paper].
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makers believe, capital markets are sufficiently integrated that the
world interest rate is unaffected by the domestic amount of saving in
anyone country, personal taxes generally will not affect the invest-
ment behavior of companies.89 Along these lines, the European Com-
mission's Working Paper on Taxation in the Internal Market (the "EC
Working Paper") recently examined a set of simulated tax reforms in
which either the domestic elements of various European corporation
tax regimes, the international elements of those regimes, or the rela-
tionship between the corporation tax regime and the personal tax re-
gime were harmonized across EC countries.90 The Commission Staff
concluded that "personal taxes have little effect on the impact of hy-
pothetical policy scenarios to corporation tax. "91
Changes in the marginal income tax rates for portfolio investors, to
some extent, might affect the allocation of portfolio investments
throughout the world. But in a classical corporate income tax system,
taxes on portfolio investors generally will not influence the decisions
of companies about where to locate their plant or equipment. Deci-
sions about where to locate productive plant and equipment are made
at the corporate level. So long as business decisionmakers cannot
know the identity and tax position of their marginal shareholders, they
will take only corporate-level taxes into account in making their busi-
ness decisions.92 As a practical matter, this seems to describe corpo-
rate behavior accurately, at least for publicly traded companies. In a
classical corporate income tax system, while corporate-level taxes
may vary depending on where investments are made, the residence
country's taxation of a portfolio investor's dividends and capital gains
typically does not vary based on the location of the corporation's
investments.93
Our conclusion that taxes on the income from FPI do not influence
the locational decisions of companies is true only if internationally
mobile portfolio capital is available to a company.94 This holds gener-
ally for large publicly traded multinational companies, which account
for the bulk of FDI, but internationally mobile portfolio capital may
not be available for small and medium-sized companies.95 As a result,
89 Id. at 142-43 box 5.
90 Id. at 215-38.
91 Id. at 223 box 10.
92 See id. at 142-43 box 5.
93 For example, a U.S. investor holding stock in a U.S. corporation faces identical tax
consequences from dividends paid on her investment regardless of whether the dividends
are paid out of income earned by the corporation in the United States or in Europe. Simi-
larly, the U.S. investor pays the same capital gains tax on his sale of shares of a U.S. corpo-
ration regardless of where that corporation earns its income. See notes 136-44.
94 See EC Working Paper, note 88, at 142·43 box 5, 150-52 box 6.
95 Id. at 142-43 box 5.
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tax policy changes for FPI might affect these companies in a way that
such changes would not affect larger multinationals. Small and me-
dium-sized companies, however, are also less likely to base their for-
eign locational decisions on tax rates, and, in any event, are relatively
unimportant in terms of the international allocation of productive
plant and equipment.
Thus, the taxation of FPI-in sharp contrast to the taxation of
FDI-has, at most, a small impact on where productive plant and
equipment will be 10cated.96 It might affect the national origin of the
owners of the company that owns the plant and equipment, and the
nations from which the capital to finance the plant and equipment has
been raised, but not the location of the plant and equipment itself.
IV. EVALUATING THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT INCOME
Most analyses of international income tax policy assume that the
fundamental goal of such policy should be to advance worldwide eco-
nomic efficiency.97 This norm in turn has been translated into "capital
export neutrality" (CEN), which requires that a nation strive for a tax
policy that is neutral about a resident's choice between domestic and
foreign investments providing the same pretax rates of return.98 CEN
requires that a resident of any nation pay the same marginal rate of
96 Another important distinction between portfolio and direct investment is that loca-
tional decisions associated with FDI are likely to be affected by effective average tax rates.
In contrast, locational decisions for portfolio investment, at most, are affected by the effec-
tive marginal tax rate. The difference is due to the fact that portfolio investment does not
come with controlling influence. For this reason, portfolio investors expect to obtain only
the required rate of return and not a share of the economic rent. If a project was expected
to earn an economic rent, its price to new investors (the market price of the portfolio)
would be higher. Therefore, a tax with a zero effective marginal rate but a positive effec-
tive average tax rate will affect the locational decisions for multinationals as contrasted to
their pretax decision, but should not affect locational decisions for portfolio investments.
97 See, e.g., Office of Tax Pol'y, Treasury Dep't, The Deferral of Income Earned
Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study 23-54 (2000), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf. For discussion of CEN see,
e.g., David F. Bradford & Treasury Dep't, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 89-90 (2d ed.,
rev. 1984); Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 102d Cong., Factors Affecting the International Compet-
itiveness of the United States 5, 236 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter JCT Competitiveness
Report]; Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 106th Cong., Overview of Present-Law Rules and Eco-
nomic Issues in International Taxation (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter JCT Economic
Issues Report]: Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 Brook. J. InCI Law 1357, 1363-71
(2001) [hereinafter Inadequate Principles].
98 See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 Tax L. Rev. 565,571-73 (1992); Daniel
J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47
Tax Notes 581, 582 (Apr. 30, 1990).
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income taxation regardless of where she invests.99 CEN also is indif-
ferent about which country obtains the income tax revenue from the
investment. lOo CEN often is advanced as the basis for the residence
country's allowing a credit for income taxes imposed by the foreign
country where the income is earned.
Businesses often advance policies based on a second kind of neu-
trality, capital import neutrality (CIN), which requires that all invest-
ments in a given country pay the same rate of income tax regardless of
the residence of the investor.101 CIN thus would subject income
earned within a country to the same overall level of taxation, whether
the income is earned by a resident or a foreigner. CIN often is ad-
vanced as a basis for taxation only by the country of source, with the
residence country exempting foreign source income from tax. 102 The
U.S. business community typically has opposed CEN and advanced
CIN in connection with arguments to improve the "competitiveness"
of U.S. multinationals doing business abroad.103 It is now well known
that it is impossible to achieve CEN and CIN simultaneously when-
ever countries' tax bases and tax rates differ.J°4 As a result, U.S. in-
ternational income tax policy (and that of other OECD nations) often
is described as a "compromise" between CEN and CIN.105 One prob-
lem with basing policy on this notion of compromise is that almost any
policy can be described as meeting the compromise criterion.
Rather than endorsing CEN or CIN-or some compromise be-
tween them-as the basis for U.S. international income tax policy, we
instead endorse the view-which one of us previously has advanced in
detail elsewhere106-that U.S. international tax policy should be fash-
ioned to advance the interests of the American people. By this we
mean long-term U.S. well-being, not short-term advantage. Design-
ing such policies requires U.S. policymakers to take into account the
99 Richard E. Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis 190 (2d ed. 1996);
Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income, 94
OJ. Econ. 793, 793-94 n.3 (1980).
100 See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, note 87, at 1604.
101 See, e.g., Caves, note 99, at 190; Frisch, note 98, at 582, 584-85.
102 See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Anal-
ysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in Taxation in the Global Economy 11,
39 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990); Frisch, note 98, at 584.
103 Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 Ariz. L.
Rev. 835 (2000); National Foreign Trade Council, The NFTC Foreign Income Project: In-
ternational Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 1999 TNT 58-17, Mar. 26, 1999, available at
LEXIS, TNT File; see also Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the
Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 18,63-70 (1993) (discussing alter-
native approaches for enhancing Ihe stability of international income taxation).
104 JCT Competitiveness Report, note 97, at 5, 240-41.
105 See, e.g., NFTC Foreign Income Project, note 103, 91 7.
106 Graetz, note 97, at 1371-77.
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potential responses of other nations and to be mindful of the substan-
tial advantages to this nation from U.S. participation and leadership in
furthering cooperation in international tax policy among nations.
Not everyone is convinced, however, that the approach to policy
that we advance here is the best normative approach to international
tax policy; both CEN and CIN still have their adherents. Thus, before
turning to the question of what tax policy for FPI would be most equi-
table and economically advantageous for Americans, we discuss in
some detail why CEN and CIN have little to offer as a basis for estab-
lishing U.S. policy for taxing income from FPI, even for those who
urge CEN or CIN as the basis for U.S. income tax policy for FDI.107
A. Capital Import Neutrality Is Not Relevant to the Taxation of
Foreign Portfolio Income
Multinational corporations sometimes have advanced CIN as the
basis for U.S. international tax policy, urging that the fundamental
purpose of such policy should be to promote the "competitiveness" of
U.S. multinationals doing business abroad. lOS The claim most often
made is that the United States should impose no residual U.S. corpo-
rate-level tax when the tax in the country where the income is earned
is below that which would have applied if the income had been earned
domestically.109 U.S. multinationals arguing for such a policy contend
that the United States should enhance (or at least not inhibit) their
ability to compete in foreign markets with multinational companies
from other OECD countries. Whatever one thinks about advancing
U.S. multinationals' competitiveness in foreign markets as a basis for
the taxation of income from FDI, it has little or no relevance to the
appropriate income taxation of FPI. Taxation of FPI, indeed taxation
107 A new standard, capital ownership neutrality (CON), recently has been advanced as
an alternative basis for developing international tax policy. Mihir A. Desai & James R.
Hines Jr., Economic Foundations of International Tax Rules (July 10, 2003) (paper pre-
pared for the American Tax Policy Institute, on file with the Tax Law Review). A tax
system satisfies CON if it does not distort ownership patterns. Id. at 23. CON maximizes
the efficient allocation of capital if the productivity of capital depends on the identities of
its owners. Id. Like CEN and CIN, CON does not provide a firm analytical foundation
from which to establish international tax policy for FPI, as opposed to FDI. As Desai and
Hines point out, the analytical force of CON depends upon ownership at a level that influ-
ences businesses' operational and investment decisions. Id. at 14-17, 34. This is not the
case for FPI. By definition, portfolio investment lacks this sort of influence on operational
and investment decisions, see notes 40-42 and accompanying text; although, as both we and
Desai and Hines point out, the 10% threshold that divides direct from portfolio investment
for purposes of U.S. tax law may be somewhat arbitrary. Desai & Hines, supra, at 34; see
also note 4.
108 See note 103.
109 Chorvat, note 103, at 845-59 (distinguishing between active foreign source income
and other forms of income).
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of investment income generally, may affect the ability of corporations
to raise capital,l1O whether from foreigners or U.S. nationals, but has
no effect on the ability of U.S. multinationals to compete against for-
eign corporations in doing business in a foreign country.
B. How Relevant Is Capital Export Neutrality to the Taxation of
Foreign Portfolio Investment Income?
Tax policy grounded on CEN should produce a tax system where
domestic and foreign investments that earn the same pretax return
also yield identical after-tax returns. CEN is intended to prevent
companies or individuals from forgoing investments with a higher
pretax yield in favor of investments with a lower pretax yield but a
higher post-tax return. 111 From a worldwide economic efficiency per-
spective, investment decisions made with reference to post-tax rather
than pretax outcomes reduce productive efficiency and create dead-
weight economic losses.112 Capital export neutrality therefore is prin-
cipally concerned with preventing tax distortions of the decisions of
U.S. and other firms about where to locate their real investment as-
sets, their plant, and equipment.113 Even in the context of direct in-
vestments, however, it is difficult to know how important such
distortions in the location of investments are to the efficient function-
ing of the world economy. As the economist Michael Keen has re-
marked: "[W]e currently know almost nothing about the quantitative
welfare implications of alternative tax treatments of cross-national di-
rect investment."114
The most important recent attempt to assess the magnitude of such
distortions in the current international tax system is the EC Working
Paper.115 That analysis demonstrates that the current international
tax system does not come close to achieving CEN for direct invest-
ments. For example, the EC Working Paper shows that U.S. compa-
nies engaging in direct European investment through European
subsidiaries face widely variant effective average tax rates in different
European countries.116
The EC Working Paper analyzes investment by a U.S. parent com-
pany in various European countries (assuming wholly-owned subsidi-
aries) and computes the effective average tax rate (EATR) for these
110 See the discussion at notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
111 See note 98.
112 Avi-Yonah, Globalization, note 87, at 1604.
113 See note 98.
114 Michael Keen, The Welfare Economics of Tax Coordination in the European Com-
munity, in The Economics of Tax Policy 206 (Michael P. Devereux ed., 1996).
115 EC Working Paper, note 88.
116 Id. at 195-97, tbls.20-22.
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direct investments.117 The EC Working Paper studied three categories
of direct investment by U.S. firms in wholly-owned European subsidi-
aries: (1) investment financed with retained earnings, (2) investment
financed with new equity, and (3) investment financed with debt. 118
The paper shows that for such FDI the EATR varies from 25% for an
investment in a subsidiary in Ireland, when the investment is financed
by retained earnings, to 43.6% for an investment in a subsidiary in
Portugal, when the investment is financed by issuing new equity.119
Even within each of the three categories of financing, variation in the
EATR is substantial. For investment financed by retained earnings,
the highest EATR was 43.5% in Germany; the lowest EATR was 25%
in Ireland.120 For investment financed by new equity, the highest
EATR was 43.6% in Portugal; the lowest EATR was 31.5% in Swe-
den. l2l For investment financed by debt, the highest EATR was
39.7% in Portugal; the lowest EATR was 31.5% in Sweden. 122
Nor does the current international tax regime achieve CEN for
portfolio investors. Our own analysis shows disparate tax rates for
FPI into different countries by U.S. investors. We calculated the total
rate of taxation borne by a top-bracket U.S. individual portfolio inves-
tor investing in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States in 2000. These computations included both the corpo-
rate-level tax on earnings and all U.S. and foreign taxes on the share-
holder. A U.S. investor, subject to the highest U.S. individual tax rate,
investing in a U.S. company bore a total marginal tax burden of 58%
on dividend payments, while the same U.S. investor paid a 40% tax on
dividends paid by a French company, 58% on dividends paid by a
German company, 45% on dividends paid by an Irish company, and
47% on dividends paid by a u.K. company.123 The total tax on divi-
117 Id. The EC Working Paper never calculates the EATR for a U.S. company engaging
in domestic direct investment. As a result that data is not included here.
118 Id. at 194-99.
119 EC Working Paper, note 88, at 195 tb1.20, 196 tb1.21. The EATR was calculated by
expressing the net present value of tax revenue from a given investment as a percentage of
the net present value of the income stream produced by the investment. The pretax rate of
return used to determine the EATR on these inframarginal investments was fixed at 20%.
Id. at 194. In making these calculations, the EC Staff considered only the effect of corpo-
rate taxes because it assumed that companies engaged in cross-border investment would
have access to the international financial market. Id. at 187.
120 EC Working Paper, note 88, at 195 tb1.20.
121 Id. at 196 tb1.21.
122 Id. at 197 tb1.22. A'1alysis of the unweighted average of all the various EATRs for
each of the EC countries across each of the forms of financing shows that the standard
deviation of the EATR on U.S. FDI in the EC is 3.4%. Id. at 204 tb1.24. The standard
deviation of the EATR on U.S. FDI in the EC rises to 3.9% when the most tax-efficient
mechanism for financing direct investment into a subsidiary in each individual EC com-
pany is used. Id. at 208 tb1.26.
123 Using highest marginal tax rates, original calculations on file with authors.
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dends earned by U.S. portfolio investors in these European countries
and in the United States varied by as much as 18 percentage points.
Both the EC Working Paper and our own calculations demonstrate
that CEN does not exist for either FDI or FPI under the current inter-
national tax regime. Investments that earn similar pretax rates of re-
turn do not earn comparable post-tax rates of return. Thus, U.S.
individuals and U.S. multinational companies may eschew investments
with higher pretax yields in favor of investments with lower pretax
yields but higher post-tax returns.
The economist Michael Devereux has illustrated in detail the poli-
cies that would be necessary to move from the current income tax
regime on foreign investment to CEN with respect to both FDI and
FPI.124 Devereux's work reveals that achieving CEN would require
the U.S. government to make a series of difficult, politically infeasible,
and undesirable tax policy changes.12s
CEN will exist for portfolio investments only if post-tax rates of
return on portfolio investments abroad are equal to those available
domestically.126 But, as Devereux demonstrates, these post-tax rates
of return on portfolio investments depend in part on rates of corpo-
rate taxation at home and abroad. If both the foreign and domestic
companies in which portfolio investments can be made are able to
choose in which country to invest, the companies will, in principle,
divide their investments (including the capital they raise via the port-
folio investments they receive) between the foreign and domestic
countries up to the point at which the post-corporate tax rate of return
124 Devereux, note 50.
125 Devereux uses a model in which there are two portfolio investors, each of which can
invest in either of two identical companies. One of those two companies is domestic and
the other is foreign. Devereux then considers two scenarios. In the first scenario, both of
the hypothetical companies reside in countries with classical tax systems. Id. at 119-23. In
the second scenario, one or both of the hypothetical companies reside in a country with an
integrated tax regime that provides some relief from corporate-level withholding to non-
resident portfolio investors. Id. at 123-26. Devereux speaks in terms of "production effi-
ciency" rather than CEN. His definition of production efficiency, however, is equivalent
with CEN so long as he is examining what he calls the "cooperative" case. Id. at 121-26.
Devereux also considers the requirements for economically efficient taxation under a set of
assumptions where countries are "non-cooperative." Id. at 126-28; see also Peter A. Dia-
mond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Effi-
ciency; II: Tax Rules, 61 Am. Econ. Rev. 8-27; 261-78 (1971); I: Production Efficiency (in
Errata), 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 238 (1972). By non-cooperative, Devereux means that the
countries are neither interested in maximizing worldwide economic efficiency regardless of
the consequences for their country nor willing to reallocate post-tax revenues between
countries to solve distributional inequities resulting from tax systems that are more eco-
nomically efficient but inequitably distribute income between countries. Id. at 116-17, 126.
Devereux argues that a non-cooperative country should implement a policy of national
neutrality with respect to both FDI and FPI. Id. at 117. For a discussion of national neu-
trality, see notes 141-152 and accompanying text.
126 Devereux, note 50, at 120.
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is equal on investments in the two countries.127 Furthermore, if the
post-corporate tax rate of return is higher in one country than in all
others at all levels of investment, then all the corporate investments
will flow to the country that provides the higher post-corporate tax
rate of return.128
Thus, in an international capital market in which investors from
both foreign and domestic countries invest in the corporations of both
foreign and domestic countries, CEN for FPI will exist only if two
conditions hold true simultaneously. First, corporate tax rates must be
independent of the location in which the investment is made.129 Sec-
ond, any differences in the corporate tax rates faced by the domestic
and foreign corporations must be offset by the personal taxes faced by
all investors. l3O
Thus, to achieve CEN, U.S. companies must face the same corpo-
rate tax rate on investments made in the United States or abroad.131
As the EC Working Paper shows, however, this condition does not
hold.132 Nor is it ever likely to hold absent a uniform worldwide tax
base and a single worldwide tax rate. Moreover, if, for example, the
corporate tax rate on companies resident in England were higher than
that on companies in the United States, in order to achieve CEN for
all U.S. portfolio investors investing into England, the United States
would need to impose a lower personal tax rate for investments in
British companies than for investments in similar U.S. companies.133
Similarly, offsetting increases or reductions in U.S. taxes for U.S. port-
folio investors would be necessary as a reaction to different corporate
tax regimes in every other nation. 134 This is not an appealing or prac-
tical personal income tax regime.
Faced with the widespread failure to achieve locational neutrality
for investments in plant and equipment, even within the countries of
the European Union, the EC Working Paper-quite properly in our
view-focuses its policy analysis and recommendations on the taxa-
tion of corporate income, principally the taxation of corporate direct
investments.l35 As we have discussed, the taxation of FPI can be ex-
pected to have little or no impact on the location of productive plant
and equipment, even if it does affect who owns the investment. Thus,
127 Id. at 121.
128 See id. 120-21.
129 Id. at 122.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 122-23.
132 See notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
133 See Devereux, note 50, at 122.
134 See id.
135 EC Working Paper, note 88, at 73-74, 131-35.
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there would be little point in striving to achieve CEN in fashioning
policy for the income taxation of residents' FPI-even if the practical
barriers to doing so were not so great.
While this conclusion seems indisputable from the perspective of a
country with a classical corporate income tax system, integration of
the corporate and individual income taxes may change the analysis.
Integrated corporate and individual tax systems add an additional
level of complexity in considering CEN for· FPI.136 Several of the
countries among the top 10 recipients of U.S. portfolio investments
have integrated their corporate and shareholder income tax systems,
at least to some extent.137 While achieving such integration by exclud-
ing all or a portion of dividends from shareholder-level taxation has
become more common in recent years, in most countries integration
was accomplished through so-called "imputation credits," shareholder
credits for all or a portion of the corporate income tax. 13S This puts
three tax variables at play (tax rules and rates at the corporate level,
imputation credits available to shareholders, and the tax rules and
rates at the personal level) in any effort to achieve CEN for FPI.139
When two countries' integration regimes interact or when an integra-
tion regime interacts with a classical regime, the simplest way to
achieve CEN for FPI would be to provide greater imputation credits
to investors in companies resident in the higher-corporate-tax-rate
country in order to offset the higher corporate tax.140 Devereux's
analysis implies that in each country in the world in which U.S. portfo-
lio investors invest, a separate credit should be calculated to offset
differences in the rate of corporate tax that exists relative to U.S. cor-
porate taxes.
This means that to achieve CEN for FPI, in the absence of CEN for
direct investment, the United States would have to tax some portfolio
investments into certain foreign countries at a lower rate than the rate
at which it taxes identical domestic portfolio investments. Moreover,
the United States also would have to negotiate bilateral tax treaties
136 Devereux, note 50, at 123-26.
137 See Ault, note 98, at 585.
138 Peter Andrew Harris, Corporate/Shareholder Income Taxation: And Allocating
Taxing Rights Between Countries 69-72 (1996). Imputation relief is one of three major
options available for providing dividend relief at the shareholder level. The other two are
dividend exclusion and shareholder differentiation. Id. at 67-69. A dividend exclusion sys-
tem excludes dividends from shareholder taxable income. Id. at 67-68. A shareholder dif-
ferentiation system reduces the shareholder tax rate applicable to dividends received
below shareholders' marginal income tax rates. Id. at 68-69. Additionally, relief of double
taxation can be achieved in principle at the corporate level as well as at the shareholder
level. Id. at 57.
139 Devereux, note 50, at 123-25.
140 Id. at 124-25.
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perfectly calibrated to offset the effects of foreign corporate and with-
holding taxes, including those above the U.S. corporate tax rate. And
the United States would have to modify the rules mandated by such
treaties each time U.S. or foreign corporate tax rates changed.
If such bilateral tax treaties were not adopted, the United States
would have two remaining options to achieve CEN. First, it might try
to convince all foreign governments to exempt income from taxation
at source. While some countries might exempt foreign investments in
an effort to attract foreign capital, taxation by the source country is
common and such an exemption would not be universally accepted.
Alternatively, the United States might try to persuade all countries in
the world to agree on a uniform corporate tax rate and also to treat
foreign and domestic portfolio and direct investors identically with re-
gard to integration credits.141 Devereux points out that if corporate
tax rates across all countries were equal, and all countries were willing
to grant imputation relief at identical rates for both domestic and for-
eign investments of their resident investors, CEN would be achieved
for FPI.142 The world, of course, is not going to harmonize tax rates or
integration systems to this extent in the foreseeable future; to date,
the EU has failed even to harmonize its corporate income tax rates.
Furthermore, the kinds of bilateral adjustments necessary to
achieve CEN for FPI in the presence of both classical and integrated
tax regimes would conflict, at least in some cases, with the principle of
nondiscrimination, that is, the requirement that foreigners and domes-
tic residents be treated similarly.143 To achieve CEN, European coun-
tries would have to adopt similar country-specific tax policies as
described above for the United States.144 Indeed, every country
would have to tax its resident investors differently depending on the
country where investments are made. But varying the level of domes-
tic taxation depending on the country where a resident invests would
violate the free movement of capital requirement of the EU Treaty.145
\4\ Id. at 124-25.
\42 Id. at 125. Finally, Devereux suggests that if integration credits were available only
on portfolio investments in domestic economies, CEN still could be achieved if both the
country of residence and country of source were to exempt all FDI from taxation. Id.
\43 Harris, note 138, at 315; see also Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties
and the Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 Tax L. Rev.
565, 600 (1992).
\44 As Devereux notes "the government in country A would need to set the personal tax
rate on outward bound FPI lower than the personal tax rate on domestic portfolio invest-
ment, in order to offset the effect of the higher corporate tax in country B. This offsetting
effect is clearly unlikely in practice." Devereux, note 50, at 122.
\45 Case C-35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financien v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. 1-
4071, 9I 62; Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art.
293, 2002 0.1. (C 325) 33.
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And this seems neither a desirable nor practical international tax
policy.
Finally, we briefly assess CEN's role for taxing FPI in a dividend
exclusion system, such as that proposed by President Bush in January
2003. The proposal would have exempted from individual income tax
dividends paid to shareholders whenever dividends were paid out of
fully taxed corporate earnings. 146 In determining whether dividends
are eligible to be excluded from the recipients' income, the proposal
would have treated foreign income taxes paid by the corporation-up
to the foreign tax credit limit-as equivalent to U.S. income taxes.147
Thus, assuming that the corporation cares whether it pays excludable
or taxable dividends to its shareholders, the dividend exclusion propo-
sal would have prevented dividend exclusion integration from chang-
ing the impact of current corporate-level taxes on companies'
decisions about where to locate their productive investments. To the
contrary, allowing excluded dividends to be paid only from corporate
income subject to U.S. taxes, as a 1992 Treasury study of a dividend
exclusion method of corporate-individual tax integration had recom-
mended,148 would have shifted incentives for corporate investment to-
ward domestic investment, again assuming that companies would
prefer paying tax-free rather than taxable dividends. Many integra-
tion systems abroad have preferred domestic over foreign invest-
ments, causing them in some instances to run afoul of the EU
prohibition of domestic legislation inhibiting the free movement of
capita1.l49
Consistent with our earlier discussion, the Bush proposal con-
formed to the view that the important decisions about the location of
productive investments are made at the corporate level. This view is
also consistent with the analysis of the EC Working Paper,150 which
treats all corporate-level taxes as important to locational decisions,
even if paid only to enable the company to pay dividends that are
146 H.R. 2, 108th Congo §§ 116, 281 (2003). Under the proposal, to compute the divi-
dends that could have been paid to shareholders without tax, a corporation would calculate
an excludable dividend amount (EDA), which is essentially equivalent to taxable income
less federal corporate income taxes paid and foreign tax credits used to offset U.S. tax
liability. If a corporation's EDA exceeded the dividend it paid in a given year, each share-
holder's basis in its stock would increase by the amount retained per share. Foreign corpo-
rations with income that was effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business or that
receive excludable dividends could pay excludable dividends under the administration's
proposal. Dividends paid out of EDA would be excludable from the income of both cor-
porate and individual recipients.
147 H.R. 2, 108th Congo § 284 (2003).
148 Treasury Dep't, Report on Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems:
Taxing Business Income Once at ix (1992).
149 B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.eR. 1-4071, 'J[ 62.
150 See notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
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either excluded from shareholders' income or for which shareholders
receive tax credits for corporate taxes paid.
On the other hand, the Bush proposal was unconcerned with
achieving neutrality in the investment choices of portfolio investors.
It provided no exclusion for dividends paid directly to U.S. portfolio
shareholders by foreign companies out of income earned outside the
United States. In this regard, the Bush plan would h,ave introduced
into the U.S. tax law a new preference for U.S. portfolio investors in
favor of investments in domestic rather than foreign corporations,151
We next turn to the question whether a preference for domestic port-
folio investment is desirable as a policy matter.
But, before leaving CEN altogether, we emphasize that the forego-
ing analysis illustrates the changes in U.S. tax policy that would be
necessary to achieve CEN for U.S. investors in the face of differences
in the taxation of both direct and portfolio investments that exist in
other countries throughout the OECD. And other countries would
have to make similar adjustments to achieve CEN on their outbound
portfolio investments. In other words, worldwide economic efficiency
cannot be achieved for investments by U.S. persons in the absence of
either uniform worldwide taxation or the kinds of offsetting adjust-
ments described above.
A different view of CEN, however, might require only that U.S.
income taxation itself not contribute to the distortion of the allocation
of capital throughout the world, in effect, regarding any distortions
that would remain as the responsibility of other nations. The idea is
that at least U.S. tax law itself would not distort worldwide economic
efficiency. For example, the limitation on the foreign tax credit could
be justified on this view-contrary to the standard view of CEN-if
the higher tax burden on foreign capital is simply regarded as a distor-
tion introduced by the tax policies of other nations. This perspective
would require far less of U.S. tax policy, only that the U.S. tax system
itself be neutral as between domestic and any foreign investments
with similar pretax rates of return.
We see little reason to take this view. The normative justification
for CEN is to achieve worldwide economic efficiency. That one coun-
try-even one as big and important as the United States-can disa-
vow responsibility for the distortions that prevail is unimportant. If
achieving CEN is the desired goal, either the nation should strive to
151 The Bush dividend exclusion proposal as described herein was not enacted. The Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302,117 Stat. 752,
758-64, reduced the tax rate applicable to dividend income, but did not create any prefer-
. ence for dividends paid by U.S. corporations or out of U.S.-source income so as to favor
domestic over foreign portfolio investment. See IRe § l(h)(ll). Nor did it tie the exclu-
sion of dividends to the existence of foreign or domestic taxes paid at the corporate level.
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achieve genuine neutrality in its residents' investment decisions or it
should strive to achieve multinational arrangements and agreements
to enhance such neutrality. Short of that, it should abandon CEN as
the normative basis for its policy and focus its efforts on something it
can better control: enhancing the well-being of its own citizens and
residents.
C. Resurrecting the Discredited Criterion of "National Neutrality":
Enhancing National Well-Being
Four decades ago, in her classic analysis of international tax policy,
the economist Peggy Musgrave demonstrated that when one views in-
ternational tax policy from a national, rather than a worldwide, per-
spective-as we do here-that the country of the investor's residence
will obtain the maximum benefit by equating pretax returns on do-
mestic investments and after-tax returns on foreign investments.152 In
essence, this policy treats returns earned both in the United States and
abroad on investments by U.S. persons as increasing the welfare of the
U.S. people, along with taxes paid to the U.S. government. From the
U.S. national perspective, taxes paid to a foreign government are sim-
ply a cost of earning income.153 This policy, which unfortunately came
to be known as "national neutrality," allows only a deduction, not a
credit, for foreign income taxes.154 In essence, it ensures that the re-
turn to the U.S. fisc from investments abroad is as great as the return
on domestic investments.
This idea of national neutrality never attracted many adherents. It
implies investments abroad will be made only when the returns after
imposition of foreign taxes are as great or greater than returns availa-
ble before tax in the United States. Obviously, this would result in
less investment abroad than that which would occur when a credit is
allowed for foreign taxes. Today "national neutrality" seems com-
pletely out of favor,155 principally, we think, because it rarely has been
examined separately in the context of FPI.
For direct investment, a policy of national neutrality is inappropri-
ate. Given the levels of corporate income taxes prevalent in the world
since World War I, allowing only a deduction for foreign income taxes
would surely have inhibited U.S. investment abroad, resulting in little
152 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income 134
(1969).
153 Id. at 99, 134.
154 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 108th Cong., The U.S. International Tax Rules: Background
and Selected Issues Relating to the Competitiveness of U.S. Businesses Abroad 20-21
(Comm. Print 2003); Frisch, note 98, at 583.
155 See, e.g., Frisch, note 98, at 583-84.
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or no U.S. direct investment in the GECD countries where most U.S.
direct investment is located today.156 For investments in Europe, Ja-
pan, and Canada, allowing only a deduction for foreign income taxes
often would have produced a combined tax rate on foreign invest-
ments of U.S. companies approaching 100% (taking into account both
corporate and shareholder-level income taxes). It is simply not plau-
sible that the standard of living of U.S. citizens and residents would be
higher today had such investments abroad not been made. 157 It is not
surprising, therefore, that no one today endorses a policy of "national
neutrality" for international direct investments. The unilateral enact-
ment by the United States of a foreign tax credit for income from
direct investments and subsequent treaty negotiations to eliminate
double taxation of such income through credits for foreign income
taxes or exemption of foreign source income has clearly served U.S.
national interests.158 Indeed, no GECD country allows only a deduc-
tion for foreign income taxes on outbound direct investments. About
one-half the GECD countries allow a foreign tax credit as in the
United States; the other half exempt foreign earnings from domestic
income taxation. 159
Such uniformity of approach does not hold, however, for FPI.
Belgium, for example, allows only a deduction for foreign income
taxes paid by domestic residents on their portfolio investments
abroad. 160 Indeed, in the context of a classical corporate income tax
or the reduced tax rate system for both foreign and domestic divi-
dends enacted in 2003, a deduction rather than a credit for foreign
taxes on portfolio investments by U.S. residents and citizens merits
serious consideration.
D. The Case for a Deduction Rather Than a Credit for Foreign
Taxes on Portfolio Investments
An FTC regime (like an exemption of foreign source income) rec-
ognizes as primary the claim to taxes on international income of the
country where the income is earned, the source country. By allowing
a credit for foreign income taxes, the residence country asserts only a
residual claim to tax revenues from the income and generally collects
156 Graetz, note 97, at 1382.
157 See id. at 1391.
158 See generally Graetz, note 97, at 1390-91.
159 Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for For-
eign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 771, 771 (2001); see also OECD, Taxa-
tion of Cross-Border Portfolio Investment: Mutual Funds and Possible Tax Distortions 30
tb1.2.1 (1999) [hereinafter OECD 1999 Report].
160 OECD 1999 Report, note 159, at 38.
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taxes only when the source country's tax rate is lower than that of the
residence country.
Principles of international equity and interpersonal fairness, how-
ever, imply that FPI should be taxed by the country where the individ-
ual resides. Most analysts contend that in the division of revenues
among countries, the source country's claim to tax international in-
come stems, in large part, from the benefits it provides that allow that
income to be earned. 161 These benefits include such things as legal
and physical infrastructure, for example. The country of source also
often provides benefits such as education to the company's workers,
who are responsible for generating much of the business's revenues;
This is one reason why revenues from taxing wages generally are allo-
cated first to the country where the wages are earned. Source-based
taxation of active business income-of direct investment-therefore is
justified, "[a]s a matter of both principle and administrative conve-
nience."162 Governments that provide the infrastructure and institu-
tional capital that enable foreigners to earn income by conducting
business activities there merit at least a substantial share of the tax
revenues from FDI if they want to claim it.
In contrast, a source country's claim to the tax revenues from FPI is
more attenuated. For portfolio income, taxation at source generally is
justified essentially on enforcement grounds. The claim is that taxa-
tion at source is essential to collect income taxes.163 Enforcement
aside, the claims of the residence country, which has funded the gov-
ernment services that provide for the well-being of the portfolio inves-
tor, seem to deserve priority in the inter-nation allocation of tax
revenues from FPI. The primary allocation of the taxation of portfo-
lio income to the residence country by the "international tax compro-
mise" reflects this priority. At most, source countries impose
withholding taxes on such income-withholding taxes that routinely
are reduced or eliminated bilaterally through tax treaties.
The fact that FDI almost always is made by corporations, while in-
dividuals account for the bulk of FPI, further supports the allocation
of the income from the former to the source country and the income
from the latter to the country where the investor resides. Corporate-
level income taxes typically are imposed at flat rates, while individual
161 See, e.g., Graetz, note 97, at 1396; Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the
Corporate Income Tax, But to Save It, 56 Tax L. Rev. 329, 335-36 (2003).
162 International Chamber of Commerce, Resolutions Unanimously Adopted by the
Committee on Double Taxation 3 (Nov. 24, 1923) (statement of T.S. Adams, tax adviser to
the U.S. Treasury), available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, box 12, 1923-24
folder; Graetz & O'Hear, note 8, at 1036.
163 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, note 1, at 1336; see also Graetz & O'Hear, note 8, at 1056-59.
We evaluate this claim separately in Section VI.
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income taxes frequently are imposed at progressive rates, rates that
increase as the individual's income increases. When an individual in-
vests abroad, only the residence country has the ability to measure the
person's worldwide income. Since the primary justification for impos-
ing personalized income taxes is the idea that taxes should vary based
on a person's ability to pay, it is essential that the residence country
take into account all income, no matter where earned, in measuring its
citizens' and residents' ability to pay,164 No one believes that source
country-imposed, gross basis withholding taxes are a good way to
measure ability to pay.165 They ignore deductions necessary to mea-
sure net income and, even if the residence country allows tax credits
for the foreign withholding taxes, the tax imposed may be inconsistent
with the residence country's judgments about appropriate taxation.
For example, the FTC may be to no avail if the shareholder is tax-
exempt.166
Source countries may levy withholding taxes on dividends to en-
courage corporations to reinvest the earnings there rather than repa-
triating them to the shareholders' residence. But such a policy has no
relevance to portfolio investors, since they cannot control a company's
decisions about paying dividends. Since it is common for source coun-
tries not to levy any tax on gains on the sale of shares by nonresidents,
the nonresident portfolio investor is taxed only on distributed, not re-
tained earnings. Moreover, unlike interest and royalties, the two
other categories of income that might be subject to withholding taxes
by source countries, dividends are not deductible in computing the
corporate tax and thus already have been taxed once by the source
country at the corporate rate. Other than historical practice, what
claim does the source country have for taxing this income twice?167
Substituting a deduction for the FTC properly recognizes as primary
the residence country's claim to foreign portfolio income.
From the residence country's perspective, the important economic
objections to substituting a deduction for the FTC with respect to in-
come from FDI do not apply to FPI. Taxation by the country of resi-
dence of portfolio income-even when that country allows a
deduction for foreign income taxes-will not distort decisions of cor-
porations about where to locate their real investments in plant or
equipment,168 Nor does such a policy inhibit free trade-the free
movement across borders of goods and services.
164 See, e.g., Green, note 103, at 29.
165 Id.
166 Vann, note 4, at 34-35.
167 Some countries provide relief for the double tax through imputation credits and a
few sometimes extend such credits to nonresidents, see id. at 50, n.27.
168 See notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
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Given the relatively small level of source-based taxation of FPI,
moving from a credit to a deduction for foreign income taxes on port-
folio investments would have only a small impact on investors' rates of
return. Figure 3 below charts after-tax rates of return to U.S. FPI into
four European countries, compared to after-tax rates of return to do-
mestic FPI, when returns are divided in different ratios between capi-
tal gains and dividend distributions, assuming in each case a 10%
pretax rate of return on equity investments.169 Figure 3 demonstrates
that substituting a deduction for the FTC would not increase the de-
gree of disparity among the after-tax returns produced by identical
investments in the most tax-favorable and least tax-favorable juris-
dictions. Substituting a deduction changes only the countries and the
dividend-to-capital gain ratios that are most tax-efficient. Thus, sub-
stituting a deduction for the foreign tax credit, in practice, would not
create any greater deviations from CEN in the U.S. international tax
system than the tax credit regime.
FIGURE 4
RATES OF RETURN GIVEN NATIONAL EATRs U.S. OUTBOUND FPI
TAXED AT THE Top BRACKET UNDER BOTH A FOREIGN TAX CREDIT





















% of Earnings Distributed as Dividends
(Assuming remainder of corporate earnings kept as cash by corporation and realized as capital gains al end of year)
Under year 2000 tax rates and law, the largest disparity in post-tax
rates of return between two identical investments by an investor sub-
ject to the top income tax rates, each with 10% pretax rates of return,
was between investments in France, with a 6.04% after-tax return, and
Germany, with a 4.22% after-tax return. This disparity, which occurs
169 Underlying calculations on file with authors. Calculations do not reflect changes in
the U.S. taxation of dividends enacted in 2003.
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when 100% of corporate earnings are distributed as dividends, repre-
sents a difference of 1.82 percentage points. With a deduction for for-
eign income taxes, the difference in after-tax returns on identical
investments with 100% of corporate earnings distributed as dividends
grows a bit. The post-tax rate of return when the United States allows
only a deduction for foreign withholding taxes for an investment in
France would equal 5.43%, while the rate of return in Germany would
be 3.59%. This represents a disparity of 1.90 percentage points,
slightly bigger, but extremely close to a credit regime. 170 Replacing
the FfC with a deduction for foreign taxes would shuffle the attrac-
tiveness of investments in various countries, decreasing in the process
the income tax disadvantage U.S. nationals now sometimes face for
domestic portfolio investments compared to FPI.17l And shifting to a
deduction would increase U.S. tax revenues,l72 perhaps by hundreds
of millions of dollars annually, revenues that might be used to de-
crease U.S. taxes on capital income generally.173
170 The 2003 Act, note 151, § 302, modified U.S. law to tax dividends at the same rate as
capital gains-currently a top rate of 15%-for taxable years beginning after 2002 and
before 2009. Under this law, the largest disparity in post-tax rates of return, with the cur-
rent foreign tax credit, between two identical investments, each with a 10% pretax rate of
return and 100% of corporate earnings distributed as dividends, is 2.8 percentage points.
This disparity arises between an investment in France, which produces an 8.5% after-tax
return, and an investment in Germany, with a 5.7% after-tax return. A deduction for for-
eign income taxes instead of the foreign tax credit would slightly increase the difference in
after-tax returns on these otherwise identical investments to 2.9 percentage points.
171 See text accompanying note 123. While substituting a deduction for foreign taxes for
the FTC would create some disincentives to portfolio investment abroad, it is far from
clear whether such a shift would have any substantial impact. As we have indicated, econ-
omists have discovered-but have yet to explain-a stubborn tendency of portfolio inves-
tors to invest in companies from their home country, notwithstanding economic advantages
for investments abroad. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text. The economic effects
from a change in the taxation of FPI could likely be significantly smaller than standard
portfolio theory would predict, at least if foreign portfolio investors' decisions fail to con-
form to economic theory in the same way as domestic portfolio investors' decisions. Id.
When dividends from FPI are taxed similarly to capital gains under the 2003 Act, note
151, substituting a deduction for foreign taxes paid for the foreign tax credit would require
structuring the deduction so that it offsets only such "qualified dividend income."
172 Since foreign withholding taxes on portfolio dividends are often imposed at a rate of
15% when received from countries with which the United States has entered into a bilat-
eral income tax treaty, the current foreign tax credit, in those cases, will fully offset the
15% tax on dividend income when such dividends are taxed at the maximum 15% rate now
applicable to capital gains. See 2003 Tax Act, note 151, § 302 (certain dividends paid by
"qualified foreign corporations" taxed as capital gain for taxable years beginning after 2002
and before 2009). In these circumstances, replacing the FTC with a deduction for foreign
taxes would allow the United States to collect some tax on income from U.S. investors'
outbound FPI in those countries. We contend here, see note 163 and accompanying text,
that residence countries should receive priority in taxing income derived from FPI.
173 Our preliminary calculations suggest that, under 2000 law and rates, moving to a
deduction for foreign taxes paid with respect to corporate and individual foreign portfolio
investors would provide approximately $350 million of additional revenue annually for the
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A deduction, rather than a credit, could serve the national interest
of the United States by improving internation equity and interper-
sonal fairness and removing tax disincentives to domestic portfolio in-
vestment, while increasing revenues. Indeed, a goal of U.S.
international tax policy should be to eliminate source-based taxes on
portfolio income altogether and focus taxing authorities internation-
ally on collecting taxes on portfolio income exclusively in the country
of residence. "U.S. tax treaty policy for many years has been to elimi-
nate (or when that is not possible, to substantially reduce) source-
country withholding taxes on [portfolio] interest and royalties. "174
And source-based taxation of portfolio income is slowly disappearing.
Since 1984, when the United States abolished its withholding tax on
portfolio interest, most investments by U.S. taxpayers that generate
portfolio interest income have become exempt from source-country
taxation. Similarly, capital gains realized by U.S. shareholders on
their sales of foreign shares now generally are taxed only by the
United States. Only portfolio dividends continue to be subject to any
significant income taxation at source, and even these source-based
withholding taxes may be in decline. 175 A deduction, rather than a
credit, coheres with an international tax policy that sees source-based
taxation of portfolio income as being, at most, a necessary expedient
U.S. fisc. This estimate assumes no behavioral changes on the part of investors as a result
of the change in the tax law. The estimate, however, is based on the value of individual
FfC claimed on interest and dividend payments in 1996 (the most recent year for which
data was available). Jeff Curry, Maureen Keenan Kahr & Sarah E. Nutter, Individual For-
eign-Earned Income and Foreign Tax Credit, 1996, SOl Bull., Summer 1999, at 130, 147-48
tbl.3, also available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0..id=96621.00.html; Nick Ward,
Corporate Foreign Tax Credit, 1996: An Industry and Geographic Focus, SOl Bull., Sum-
mer 2000, at 180, 209-11 tbl.2, also available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/
0"id=96337,00.html. The estimate also assumes that all individuals who claim the FfC are
in the top individual tax bracket. Note that individuals outside the top tax bracket claimed
at least 28% of the total individual FfC claimed in 1996. Furthermore, our calculation also
ignores the exception for working capital investments discussed at note 176 and accompa-
nying text. Finally, the estimate does not take into account changes in the taxation of
dividends enacted, on a temporary basis, in 2003. For these reasons the estimated revenue
gain from this preliminary calculation is probably high, but there seems to be some sub-
stantial revenue at stake. Gary Hufbauer, who assumes that a U.S. move to a deduction
for foreign taxes paid with respect to outbound FPI and abolition of U.S. withholding taxes
on inbound FPI would be accompanied by worldwide abandonment of withholding tax
regimes, has calculated that moving to a deduction system would generate as much as $12
billion annually. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, U.S. Taxation of International Income: Blueprint
for Reform 76 (1992). We are skeptical of Hufbauer's assumption that withholding tax
rates would fall to zero in all countries that are important recipients of U.S. outbound FPI.
See notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
174 Barbara Angus, Treasury Testimony at Foreign Relations Hearing on Pending Tax
Treaties, 'll 28 (Mar. 5, 2003), 2003 TNT 45-19, Mar. 7, 2003, available at LEXIS, TNT File
(testimony of Barbara Angus, Int'! Tax Counsel, Treasury Dep't, Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations).
175 See, e.g., U.K.-U.S. Treaty, note 20, art. 10, 'll 3, 4 Tax Treaties (CCH) 'll 10,900.
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for preventing tax evasion on portfolio dividends. We consider alter-
native ways successfully to prevent tax evasion on residence based
taxes in Section VI.
1. Two Caveats to the Case for a Deduction Rather Than a Credit
We would make one exception to our proposal that a deduction be
substituted for the credit now allowed for foreign income taxes on
FPI. Corporations often invest, usually on a short-term basis, a cer-
tain level of funds as working capital for their ongoing business opera-
tions. Such working capital is a necessary adjunct to corporate direct
investments abroad. Foreign corporations often invest such working
capital abroad, even when the corporation is owned by one or more
U.S. corporations or other U.S. shareholders. Income from such in-
vestments of working capital generally are treated as FPI. Since such
income actually represents active business income of the corporation,
we would continue to allow an FfC on portfolio income earned from
corporate investments of working capital.176
Furthermore, the computations of the impact of moving from a
credit to a deduction on an investor's rate of return presented above
are based on a U.S. classical corporate income tax system. President
Bush's January 2003 proposal to integrate the corporate and share-
holder taxes through an exclusion from income for dividends would
have moved the U.S. tax system with regard to FPI generally in a di-
rection similar to that which would occur by substituting a deduction
for the FfC in the current classical system. Under the Bush plan, the
United States would have exempted from tax dividends paid by do-
mestic companies on earnings abroad, but not dividends paid to U.S.
shareholders by foreign companies from similar investments. In this
scenario, some countries would likely retain withholding taxes at
source on dividends, and elimination of such taxes would likely occur
only through bilateral treaty negotiations. As with many integration
systems, U.S. tax law then would systematically favor investment in
domestic over foreign companies. If dividends from U.S. companies
were excluded from shareholders' income, but not dividends from for-
eign earnings of foreign companies, the case for retaining the FfC for
foreign withholding taxes imposed on dividends paid from foreign
companies might seem stronger on both equity and economic effi-
ciency grounds. Under a dividend exclusion, the normative back-
ground against which to compare taxes on dividends paid from FPI
176 For further discussion of the working capital issue, see Graetz & Oosterhuis, note
159, at 775 (recommending that the definition of working capital under Subpart F be based
on a proportion of total gross income or total assets).
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would be a zero rate of U.S. tax on most domestic dividends. It no
longer would make sense to consider the FTC on taxes paid on divi-
dends from FPI a loss to the U.S. Treasury, since dividends received
on FPI invariably would face a higher rate of tax than comparable
investments in the United States. The Bush proposal, however, was
not enacted by Congress, which instead decided-at least on a tempo-
rary basis-simply to lower the tax rate on dividends, whether from
domestic or most foreign investments. l77
V. SHOULD WE WORRY ABOUT THE RESPONSE-OR PERHAPS EVEN
RETALIATION-BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS?
With direct investments, attempting to pursue U.S. national inter-
ests through a policy of national neutrality-allowing a deduction
rather than a credit for foreign taxes-would be folly. Not only would
direct investments abroad by U.S. multinationals shrink toward noth-
ing, but other countries might retaliate against the United States by
allowing only a deduction rather than a credit or exemption for in-
come from their companies' direct investments in the United States.
This would deprive the United States of the advantages of both out-
bound and inbound direct investments, a consequence that surely
could not be described as advancing the interests of U.S. residents and
citizens.
But such dire consequences would not follow if the United States
were to substitute a deduction for the FTC with respect to FPI. As we
have shown, the most likely scenario would be some shifting of portfo-
lio equity investments by U.S. residents and citizens to U.S. compa-
nies with little or no effect on the location of real investments in plant
and equipment throughout the world. In the case of FPI in the form
of debt, most U.S. lenders are not taxed by the source country and the
choice between a deduction and a credit is generally irrelevant. The
question remains, however, how other countries likely would respond
to a shift from a credit to a deduction with regard to outbound portfo-
lio equity investments from their countries. We cannot be certain.
The economist Gary Hufbauer has suggested that if the United
States were to abolish its FTC for outbound FPI and eliminate all of
its withholding taxes on inbound FPI, market forces would lead other
countries to drop their withholding taxes as well.178 Hufbauer con-
tends that residence-based taxation alone would result, and that this
would produce a more efficient worldwide allocation of capital.179
177 IRC § l(h)(ll).
178 Hufbauer, note 173, at 67-68.
179 Id at 65-68.
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Hufbauer's essential premise is that U.S. portfolio investment is suffi-
ciently large that it lowers the cost of capital in economies where it is
present. He claims that without a FTC, U.S. investors would "with-
draw funds from countries that imposed withholding taxes on [portfo-
lio] income."180
Hufbauer cites Germany's 1989 attempt to institute a withholding
tax on interest to support his prediction.181 In that instance, German
banks confronted a massive withdrawal of foreign-owned capital to
jurisdictions such as Luxembourg and Switzerland, which impose no
withholding tax on interest income. Eventually, pressure by German
banks forced the German government to repeal its withholding tax.182
Hufbauer suggests a similar dynamic would occur if the United States
were to eliminate its FTC.183
To be sure, allowing only a deduction for foreign taxes on FPI
would disfavor FPI whenever the foreign before-tax rates of return
were equal to domestic pretax rates of return if the foreign jurisdiction
had any source-based tax on income from portfolio investments.
Those foreign jurisdictions with zero or lower source-based taxes
would be favored by U.S. portfolio investors over countries with
higher source-based taxes. Hufbauer predicts that competition for
U.S. capital would lead source countries interested in U.S. portfolio
investments to abolish any remaining source-based taxation of such
investments. Hufbauer therefore expects withholding rates on divi-
dends to disappear if the United States were to substitute a deduction
for the FTC.184 Under current U.S. tax law, zero source-based taxa-
tion would make domestic portfolio investments equally favorable on
an after-tax basis as FPI with comparable (risk-adjusted) pretax rates
of return.
We are more skeptical than Hufbauer about the magnitude of the
shifts in portfolio investment flows that would be likely to accompany
a U.S. shift to a deduction for foreign income taxes on FPI. The cur-
rent multinational allocation of FPI by U.S. investors persists despite
substantial variance in after-tax rates by country. U.S. portfolio in-
vestors already experience significantly different effective tax rates in
multiple geographies with imperceptible effects on portfolio alloca-
tions. For instance, the effective tax rate for U.S. investors on invest-
ments in France through U.S.-based mutual funds has been more than
20 percentage points lower than a similar investment in Germany.18S
180 Id. at 68.
181 Id. at n.ll & 69 n.13.
182 Id. at 69 n.13.
183 Id. at 68.
184 Id.
i85 OEeD 1999 Report, note 159, at 42 tb1.2.7.
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Nevertheless, Germany remains the fifth largest recipient of U.S. in-
vestment, with more U.S. FPI than France. Nor do we find the Ger-
man case Hufbauer cites persuasive; the differences between the U.S.
and German situations are quite substantial.186 Thus, we would pre-
dict much smaller investment shifts than Hufbauer from replacing the
FTC with a deduction for foreign withholding taxes. Indeed, some
evidence suggests that portfolio managers' interest in diversification
may be sufficiently high to make the percentage of their investments
allocated to foreign jurisdictions quite inelastic. The UN Commission
on Investment, Technology, and Related Financial Issues, for exam-
ple, claims that between 1991 and 1999 investments in emerging mar-
kets in general decreased the return on global portfolios and increased
their volatility.18? UNCTAD's survey of fund managers revealed that
despite this fact, fund managers reported that they "continue[d) to be-
lieve in the benefits of diversifying into emerging markets and d[id]
not plan to discontinue investing in such markets."188
Thus, we do not expect major shifts in U.S. portfolio investments
from this proposed change in tax policy, although some reshuffling
among favored destinations for FPI might occur. It is impossible,
however, given the available data, to be confident about the effects on
portfolio investments from a policy shift from the FTC to a deduction
for foreign taxes paid. In any event, the current trend is toward lower
withholding taxes for portfolio dividends, the only form of FPI cur-
rently subject to any substantial source-based taxation. We expect
that trend to continue and we agree with Hufbauer that it might well
186 Another anecdotal example that often is mentioned in discussions regarding the ef-
fect of changes in U.S. tax policy on FPI patterns is the U.S. experience in the Eurobond
market after the 1984 repeal of the 30% withholding tax on portfolio interest paid to for-
eign residents. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127(a), 98 Stat. 494,
648-50 (codified as amended at IRC § 871(h)). The widespread utilization of Netherlands
Antilles finance subsidiaries by U.S. corporate borrowers to access the Eurobond market
prior to repeal of the 30% portfolio interest withholding tax and the subsequent transition
to direct borrowing in the Eurobond market following the repeal of the withholding tax
illustrate that U.S. multinational corporations will go to great lengths to obtain cheaper
financing by providing tax-favorable investment vehicles to creditors. See generally Leslie
E. Papke, One-Way Treaty With the World: The U.S. Withholding Tax and the Nether-
lands Antilles, 7 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 295 (2000). Lessons from the Eurobond case princi-
pally concern the effect of tax policy changes on the actions of U.S. multinationals, and are
of limited relevance in considering the responsiveness of U.S. outbound foreign portfolio
investors to changes in U.S. tax policy.
187 UNCTAD Report, note 23, at 14. A strong interest in diversification, making overall
levels of FPI inelastic, is consistent with speculative volatility. While small shifts in rates of
return may encourage portfolio managers to shift their allocations between foreign portfo-
lio investments, a desire for diversification will lead those managers to keep the capital in
question in some form of foreign investment.
188 Id.
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be accelerated if the United States were to shift from the FTC to a
deduction for foreign taxes on income from FPI.
VI. COLLECTING RESIDENCE-BASED TAXES ON FPI Is THE
KEY CONCERN
The major issue facing the United States, as well as all other capital-
exporting nations, with regard to FPI is enforcement of residence-
based income taxation on income earned abroad.189 We argue here in
favor of a policy of taxation of FPI by residence countries and suggest
elimination of taxation of such income at source. In this connection,
we suggest that the United States should consider replacing its credit
for such income with a deduction for foreign taxes. The major diffi-
culty for any regime of taxing FPI, however, is the widespread under-
reporting and evasion of income taxes. While shifting from the FTC
to a deduction might increase the tax savings from evasion in some
cases, underreporting of income from FPI is also beneficial when a
credit is allowed for foreign withholding taxes. Relying on source-
based withholding taxes as the principal enforcement mechanism is
simply to accept the impracticality of enforcing residence-based taxes,
clearly a second-best outcome. There is no other compelling policy
justification for the imposition of withholding taxes at source.
We do not agree that enforcing residence-based taxes is impractical.
Ultimately, therefore, the question becomes how to enforce resi-
dence-based taxation of FPI. Multilateral cooperation and coordina-
tion is the linchpin for success, but unilateral innovations also may
help.
A. The Magnitude of Underreporting and Evasion of Taxes on
Foreign Portfolio Investment
The extent of underreporting and tax evasion of FPI is, of course,
unknown. If we knew what income was underreported, we would
know enough to collect the tax. The best data available, however, sug-
gests that tax evasion by foreign portfolio investors is common-
place.19o Foreign investment earnings are substantially easier than
domestic earnings for investors to underreport or to fail to report to
their residence country's tax authority.191
In March 1994, for the first time in 50 years, Treasury conducted a
comprehensive survey of outbound portfolio investments from the
189 See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of
Fiscal Termites, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1261, 1262, 1274-75 (2001).
190 Graetz, note 97, at 1414-15.
191 Tanzi, note 189, at 1274-75.
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United States.192 As a result of this survey, the Department of Com-
merce revised its 1993 estimates of portfolio interest income on for-
eign bonds earned by U.S. persons upward by $6.1 billion, from $17.2
billion to $23.3 billion,193 and its estimate of portfolio dividends on
stocks upward by $4.1 billion, from $6.8 billion to $10.9 billion. 194 The
1993 estimate of U.S. holdings of foreign stocks increased from $302.8
billion to $543.9 billion.195 In 1997, a similar Treasury survey pro-
duced a reduction of more than $10 billion in the reported U.S. bal-
ance of payments deficit due to increased estimates of interest and
dividends received by U.S. residents from foreign securities.l96 In
combination, the magnitude of these adjustments suggests massive
gaps in the tax reporting of interest, dividends, and capital gains from
FPJ.197 As foreign investments have increased over time, the limited
ability to tax foreign earnings has become an increasingly serious
problem for tax administrators.
Bilateral action by the United States and its treaty partners through
tax treaty renegotiations may help combat the underreporting prob-
lem. The GECD has suggested that countries intensify the ex-
change-of-information provisions in their tax treaties.198 Tax treaties
also could incorporate additional provisions encouraging coordinated
tax enforcement and assistance in enforcing each country's tax laws by
other signatories.
B. Current Multilateral Efforts to Improve Information Reporting
Jurisdictional limitations, tax competition, and administrative obsta-
cles have limited the effectiveness of unilateral or bilateral approaches
to address underreporting of income from FPI.199 Thus, multilateral
coordination has become necessary to achieve the effective interna-
tional information exchanges required for residence-based taxation of
FPI income.2oo The GECD's Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (the
GECD Forum) represents one such effort,201 Established in April
1998, the GECD Forum's purpose has been to examine various ap-
192 Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1994 Benchmark Survey, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Final Results, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (1998); see also Treasury FLTS Report, note
26; Bach, note 26, at 46-48.
193 Bach, note 26, at 47.
194 Id. at 48.
195 Id. at 47.
196 Treasury FLTS Report, note 26, at 2.
197 Graetz, note 97, at 1414.
198 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue 46-7, 'j['j[ 114-17
(1998) [hereinafter OECD 1998 Report].
199 Id. at 37-43; Herman, note 1, at 223-38.
200 GECD 1998 Report, note 198, at 53-55, 'II'll 140-48; Herman, note 1, at 238.
201 OECD 1998 Report, note 198, at 53-55, 'II'll 140-48.
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proaches that groups of countries might take to collect tax revenues
from FPI that flows through offshore financial centers and tax havens
and to control the growth of so-called "harmful preferential tax re-
gimes" within the developed world.202 Estimates suggest that the
value of deposits in offshore financial centers and tax haven countries
exceeds $5 trillion.203 Since 2000, the GECD has successfully ob-
tained commitments to share information internationally from a num-
ber of jurisdictions traditionally considered tax havens.204 This
success suggests that, at the very least, the threat of coordinated multi-
lateral defensive measures may coerce tax havens into entering into
information exchange agreements with GECD countries.
Since 1998, the GECD Forum also has worked to create multilateral
norms of transparency of financial transactions, which, in combination
with comprehensive information exchange, it believes may substan-
tially reduce the evasion and underreporting of income from interna-
tional investments.205 The GECD Forum regards transparency as
requiring publicized rates of taxation for enterprises and individuals in
a given jurisdiction and the elimination of the ability to negotiate their
rate of tax.206 According to the GECD Forum, "[t]ransparency also
requires financial accounts to be drawn up in accordance with gener-
ally accepted accounting standards and that such accounts either be
audited or filed."207 Governments also are required to have access to
information identifying the beneficial ownership of all types of entities
in the country and access to all types of bank information relevant to
tax matters.208 All the information one country gathers should be
made available on request to any other national tax authority.209 The
only limitation is that the requesting authority must commit to use
"the information obtained and provided ... only for the purposes for
which it was [specifically] sought."210
In 2000, the GECD Forum compiled a list of 47 jurisdictions that
were classified as tax havens based on the factors the GECD had
202 Id. at 37-59 (setting forth Forum's mandate).
203 Tanzi, note 189, at 1271 (citing UN, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money
Laundering 71 (1998».
204 Anne-Marie Berthault, A French Perspective on Tax Havens and Bank Secrecy: Is
the Future a Transparent One?, 22 Tax Notes Int'I 3171, 3172-73 (June 18,2001).
20S See, e.g., OECD, The OECD's Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress
Report 10. 'II'lI 28, 36-38 (2001) [hereinafter OECD 2001 Progress Report]. available at
http://www.sourceoecd.org/content/html/index.htm.
206 Id. at 11, ~ 37.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 11, 'II'lI 37·38.
210 Id. at 11, ~ 38.
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identified in 1998.211 The GECD Forum began communicating with
these states, which are not GECD members, to explore their potential
cooperation in establishing international standards of transparency,
fairness, and disclosure in tax practices.212 The Forum promised to
leave off its public list of uncooperative tax havens any jurisdiction
that made a public commitment to "adopt a schedule of progressive
changes to eliminate its harmful tax practices by 31 December
2005."213
In June 2000 the GECD announced that six jurisdictions, Bermuda,
the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino, all tax
havens, had committed to create mechanisms for international ex-
changes of information and to improve their practices by 2003 for
criminal matters and by 2005 for civil matters.214 By 2002 31 jurisdic-
tions had made such commitments.215 The GECD's success in ob-
taining commitments from these countries suggests that the threat of
multilateral coordinated defensive measures by a number of large de-
veloped economies can successfully pressure offshore jurisdictions to
enter into information exchange agreements.216
Another recent GECD report addressed how bank secrecy may be
used to hide illegal activities and to escape domestic taxes.217 The re-
port recommended the elimination of anonymous accounts and a re-
examination of the "domestic tax interest" requirement for
information exchange.218 The domestic tax interest requirement,
which some countries have applied, provides that a treaty country can-
not obtain bank information from a treaty partner unless the country
with access to the information itself has an interest in obtaining that
211 OECD, Towards Global Tax Cooperation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating
Harmful Tax Competition 6, 10 (2000) [hereinafter OECD 2000 Progress Report].
212 The OECD Forum also decided that it would create a List of Uncooperative Jurisdic-
tions comprised of countries that met the tax haven criteria and chose not to eliminate
their harmful tax practices after being put on notice by the OECD. The Forum's 2000
Progress Report suggested that OECD members could subject these states to coordinated
defensive measures. Id. at 6-7. The OECD Forum published this list in 2002. See OECD,
List of Uncooperative Jurisdictions (Apr. 18,2002), available at http://www.oecd.orgiEN/
documen t/O"EN-document-103-nodirectorate-no-12-28534-22,00.html.
213 OECD 2000 Progress Report, note 211, at 19, lJI 21.
214 Berthault, note 204, at 3173.
215 List of Uncooperative Jurisdictions, note 212.
216 Some analysts believe that the OECD Forum process will ultimately fail. Peter
Manyasz, Tax Havens Outcome of OECD Meeting Disputed; Two Jurisdictions Drop
Commitments, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-8 (Oct. 16,2003). Nevertheless, the sheer num-
ber of offshore jurisdictions involved in the OECD process shows the potential of that
process to influence the information exchange practices of offshore jurisdictions.
217 OECD, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes (2000), available at
http://www.sourceoecd.org/content/html/index.htm. [hereinafter OECD 2000 Reportl
218 Id. at 14.
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information for its own tax purposes.219 The OECD report also rec-
ommended a reexamination of policies and practices that prevent ex-
change of information for criminal tax cases and initiatives to achieve
access to bank information for civil tax cases.220
In 2003, the OECD published an updated version of the OECD
Model Tax Convention, which includes a new Article 27 obligating
"Contracting States [to] lend assistance to each other in the collection
of revenue claims."221 Article 27 requires contracting states to collect
revenue claims for the other contracting state as if the revenue claim
were a revenue claim of the state doing the administration and en-
forcement,222 Under this article, tax authorities of contracting states
would apply their administrative and enforcement mechanisms exactly
as if they were collecting their own revenue claims, with one major
caveat. The Commentary suggests that under <JI 6 of Article 27 "no
legal or administrative proceedings, such as a request for judicial re-
view, shall be undertaken in the requested state with respect to mat-
ters of the existence, validity or amount of a tax claim."223
C. Will Information Exchange Agreements Prevent Underreporting
and Evasion?
In the domestic context, the United States has successfully used in-
formation reporting in lieu of withholding to collect income taxes on
domestic interest, dividends, and capital gains.224 In the transnational
context, the United States already exchanges tax information with
other jurisdictions through U.S. income tax treaties, tax information
exchange agreements (TIEAs) , and mutual legal assistance treaties
(MLATs).225 Under most U.S. tax treaties and TIEAs, requests for
assistance may be made for any civil or criminal tax investigation not
barred by the statute of limitations, and information can be exchanged
regarding any relevant person.226 The amount of underreporting of
FPI uncovered by the recent Treasury surveys makes clear, however,
that current international information exchanges are inadequate to
prevent evasion of income tax on foreign income.227
219 Berthault, note 204, at 3172.
220 DECD 2000 Report, note 217, at 14-15.
221 DECD Model Treaty, note 13, at art. 27, <j[ 1.
222 Id. art. 27, <j[ 3.
223 Commentary on the DECD Model Tax Convention Proposed art. 27, <j[ 28.
224 Graetz, note 97, at 1415.
225 Bruce Zagaris, Selected Aspects of U.S. International Exchange of Information, 18
Tax Notes Int'l 1725 (Apr. 26, 1999).
226 Id.
227 See notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
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EU nations, however, are now using information reporting as a sub-
stitute for withholding with some success.228 At an April 2000 sum-
mit, EU member states reached an agreement requiring source
countries either to impose withholding taxes or to engage in informa-
tion exchange with respect to the taxation of passive income.229 A
number of countries that had been unwilling to impose low-rate with-
holding taxes were willing to cooperate in extensive information re-
porting.230 The success of information reporting within the EU offers
hope that a similar regime might be negotiated among all the major
developed economies.
The United States has not stood idly by awaiting the implementa-
tion of successful multilateral actions directed at enforcement of in-
come taxes on FPI. Since 1997, the Service has attempted to induce
foreign financial intermediaries doing business in the United States to
cooperate in revealing U.S. persons who earn portfolio income. The
basic arrangement is that the United States will grant anonymity to
foreign investors of foreign financial intermediaries in exchange for
the intermediaries' cooperation in collecting tax owed by U.S. citizens
and ensuring that only those foreigners entitled to reductions of U.S.
withholding taxes by virtue of a treaty are receiving the treaty bene-
fits.231 With a major exception for bearer bonds, the goals of the qual-
ified intermediary regime are to identify all U.S. persons receiving
income from non-U.S. intermediaries and to curb "treaty shopping"
abuses so that only genuine residents of treaty countries obtain treaty
benefits. These know-your-customer rules require the foreign finan-
cial institution to identify U.S. customers who hold accounts and to
withhold taxes due from foreigners.232
Obviously, the Service's efforts to enlist foreign financial in-
termediaries offer only a partial solution to the problem of underre-
228 Graetz, note 97, at 1415.
229 Id., see also lain Scoon & Sasha Carter, EU Savings Tax Directive: Saved at Last?,
30 Tax Notes Int'! 1179, 1179-82 (June 23, 2003) (describing the directive the ECOFIN
Council of the EU adopted on June 3, 2003 regarding automatic exchange of information
or the imposition of a withholding tax in the absence of automatic exchange of information
(a transitory option available only to Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg) with respect to
interest payments to, or for the benefit of, resident individuals of EU member states).
230 Graetz, note 97, at 1415.
231 Stephen E. Shay, 1. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert 1. Peroni, "What's Source Got to
Do With It?" Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, NYU School of Law (Nov.
13, 2003), The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, in 56 Tax L. Rev. 81, 124-28 (2002).
232 Id. The United States also has taken some measures to improve its ability to provide
information as part of exchanges of information with its tax treaty partners. See, e.g., Prop.
Regs. §§ 1.6049-6 & 1.6049-8(a), as amended by 67 Fed. Reg. 50386, 50388-50389 (Aug. 2,
2002) (requiring reporting of U.S. bank deposit interest paid to resident individuals of Aus-
tralia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
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porting. U.S. investors may move their money away from these
institutions to others offshore that preserve their anonymity. But en-
listing the aid of financial intermediaries is an innovative step toward
greater enforcement, one that seems likely to take on greater impor-
tance in the years ahead. And perhaps unilateral actions such as these
will spur additional multilateral coordination and cooperation.
When foreign portfolio income is earned outside the major devel-
oped countries, however, additional problems occur in obtaining ef-
fective information exchange and transparency.233 Vito Tanzi has
suggested that obstacles created by language differences, along with
the resource burdens on information-providing countries of collecting
and organizing the massive flow of information about individual inves-
tors, may limit the ability of international information exchange to
prevent tax evasion on foreign portfolio income earned in tax havens
and developing countries.234
More generally, Tanzi identifies three "fiscal termites" specifically
related to portfolio investment that he regards as making income
taxes increasingly difficult to collect: (1) the pressures arising from
the growth of off-shore financial centers and tax havens and the falling
transaction costs connected with using their services, (2) the increas-
ing availability of derivatives and hedge funds as vehicles for portfolio
investment, and (3) the general difficulty of taxing financial capital as
the international capital market becomes more integrated and effi-
cient,235 Tanzi believes that these "termites," combined with other
difficulties related to the increasing mobility of labor and capital, will
force the developed economies to become increasingly reliant on
taxes that are little affected by these problems, for example, immobile
factors of production or resources.236
Tanzi observes that hedge funds and new financial products may
pose even more intractable problems than standard forms of FPJ.237
He contends that tax authorities may not be able to cope with these
complex arrangements, even when they have all the requisite informa-
tion available.238 Tanzi points out that with hedge funds utilizing de-
rivatives "the distinction between capital income and capital gains or
losses becomes fluid when a contingent claim (gain or loss) can be
233 Tanzi, note 189, at 1271-72, 1274-75.
234 Id. at 1279.
235 Id. at 1271-74.
236 Id. at 1282.
237 Id. at 1272-73.
238 Vito Tanzi & Howell H. Zee, Taxation in a Borderless World: The Role of Informa-
tion Exchange, in International Studies in Taxation: Law and Economics 321, 328-29 (Gus-
taf Lindencrona, Sven-Olof Lodin & Berti! Wiman eds., 1999).
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created on a structure of certain cash flows (income)."239 Derivative
products made available through hedge funds also can easily manipu-
late the distinction between dividends and interest.24o Thus, deriva-
tives and hedge fund investments create significant challenges for the
taxation of portfolio income generally, and foreign portfolio income in
particular.241 At least $1 trillion is currently estimated to be chan-
neled through hedge funds, and hedge funds are growing in popularity
as a vehicle for portfolio investments among wealthy investors.242
We do not completely share Tanzi's pessimism in this regard, but it
would be foolish not to acknowledge the difficulties new financial
products pose for income tax systems generally. They challenge the
notion of a sharp division among dividend, interest, and capital gain
income that has been so fundamental to the taxation of both domestic
and foreign portfolio income. Addressing the challenges that these
innovations pose for income taxation, however, is well beyond the
scope of this Article. They require substantive changes in classifica-
tions and taxation of income, raising a host of issues far beyond the
question we address here of the efficacy of withholding taxes versus
information reporting as a potential response to the underreporting of
income taxes on FPI. But failing to acknowledge the existence of
these challenges would make us seem Pollyannas, which we are not.
Recent OECD experience makes clear that the United States can
playa constructive role in establishing information reporting regimes
to better serve U.S. national interests. This may be done both through
bilateral and multilateral negotiations and through diplomatic efforts
by the world's largest economy.243 It also now seems likely that Eu-
rope will press ahead to create international tax reporting standards
through OECD and UN processes, regardless of whether the United
States participates. Only by engaging information reporting issues at
the multilateral level will the United States be able to ensure that
agreements eventually reached by developed countries will be consis-
tent with U.S. interests and our legal capacities to comply.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that the standard analysis of international
tax policy, which either has lumped direct and portfolio investment
239 Tanzi, note 189, at 1273.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1272 (citing Howard Davies, Creeping Growth of the Hedge Funds, Fin. Times,
Aug. 15, 2000, at 19).
243 See, e.g., Herman, note 1, at 423 (noting that the United States could use its domi-
nant role in the world's financial system to encourage multilateral cooperation in tax
enforcement).
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together or has ignored portfolio income altogether, is inadequate.
International portfolio income has now become sufficiently important
in the world economy to warrant independent analysis.
Indeed, careful analysis has demonstrated that the standard norma-
tive criteria most widely used to evaluate international tax policies-
CEN and CIN-are inapt for portfolio income. And, the principal
concern of CEN-neutrality in business decisions concerning the loca-
tion of real investment in plant and equipment-is not affected by the
taxation of international portfolio income. Moreover, given the wide
variation in both corporate and individual tax rates, as well as the vari-
ety of policies in integrated tax systems regarding the treatment of
foreign shareholders, any attempt to achieve genuine CEN in the tax-
ation of portfolio income would require impractical and undesirable
case-by-case distinctions by resident countries for investments in spe-
cific foreign countries. Proponents of CEN should focus their atten-
tion on redressing the distorting tendencies in the current taxation of
direct investments.
When one evaluates the taxation of international portfolio income
from the perspective of national well-being-the welfare of U.S. citi-
zens and residents and fairness in their taxation-the case for the cur-
rent FTC weakens substantially. Indeed, a strong case can be made
for replacing the FTC with a deduction for foreign withholding taxes.
Ultimately, the goal should be to eliminate altogether source-based
taxation of international portfolio income.
The key difficulty for residence-based taxation of international
portfolio income results from the widespread underreporting and eva-
sion that now occurs. Any solution to that problem necessarily will
require both unilateral and multilateral actions. The good news is that
the United States has already taken a major step forward in its infor-
mation reporting requirements for qualified financial intermediaries,
and recent actions in both the OECD and the EU offer promise of
vastly improved multinational cooperation. The advent of new finan-
cial innovations and the persistence of financial tax havens and bank
secrecy ensure, however, that there will be many opportunities for im-
provement for years to come.
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